The Mehadrin Of Chanukah

The Mehadrin Of Chanukah

The Gemara in Shabbos 21b says that there are three levels whereby one can fulfill the obligation of the mitzvah of Chanukah: basic, mehadrin, and mehadrin min hamehadrin. The basic requirement of the mitzvah of Chanukah is to light one candle each night per household. To fulfill the mehadrin level one must light a separate candle for each member of the household every night. In order to fulfill the level of mehadrin min hamehadrin, according to Beis Hillel, one must add one new candle each night, totaling eight candles on the eighth night.

The Rambam and Tosafos have a machlokes regarding this halacha. The Rambam (Hilchos Chanukah 4:1) says that if one wishes to perform the mehadrin min hamehadrin, he should light a candle for every member of his household and add one for each person on each night. Tosafos (Shabbos 21b) says that the halacha of mehadrin min hamehadrin does not encompass the mehadrin level. In other words, when one intends to fulfill the mehadrin min hamehadrin level by adding a candle each night, only the head of the house should light the menorah – not the entire household. Tosafos explains that if the entire household lights their own menorahs, an outsider will not be able to determine what day it is, since too many lit candles may confuse the outsider as to how many people are actually in the house. Therefore, when performing on the mehadrin min hamehadrin level, one does not light a separate menorah for each member of his household.

Regarding this machlokes the Ramah (Orach Chaim 671:2) rules in a similar way to Rambam's ruling – with one variation. The Rambam said that the head of the household lights a separate menorah for each member of his household. The Ramah says that every member should light their own menorah.

The Brisker Rav, in his sefer on the Rambam (Hilchos Chanukah 4:1), explains that the point on which the Rambam and the Ramah disagree is based on a different machlokes. In order to perform a bris milah one must remove a certain amount of the skin. Although one can fulfill the mitzvah by removing the minimal amount, it is preferable (mehadrin) to remove the entire foreskin. If one finished performing the bris having removed the minimal amount of foreskin, there is a machlokes regarding whether he can return to remove more of the foreskin. The Beis Halevi explains that the Rishonim who opine that one cannot revisit to remove more of the foreskin believe that mehadrin can only be performed in the action of the mitzvah. Once the mitzvah is fulfilled, any further actions are not considered part of the mitzvah. Thus one cannot return to remove more of the foreskin, since he has already fulfilled his obligation of the mitzvah.

The Brisker Rav explains that the Rambam is of the opinion that one cannot return to remove more of the foreskin. Therefore, we can assume that he believes that mehadrin can only be performed while one is performing the mitzvah, not after he has fulfilled his obligation. Thus the Rambam rules that in order to fulfill mehadrin, the head of the household must light the candles on behalf of his household. The reason is that if each member would light the menorah individually, once the head of the household lights he has fulfilled the mitzvah and can no longer perform mehadrin. Hence the head of the household should light for each member in order for it to be considered one action of lighting.

The Ramah (Yoreh De'ah 264:5) sides with the Rishonim who say that one can return to remove more of the foreskin. He therefore rules that each member of the household can light individually since even once the mitzvah is fulfilled, one can still perform mehadrin. Alternatively we can explain that the Ramah disagrees with the Rambam regarding the issue that when each individual member lights his own candle, it is considered one action of the mitzvah. So even according to other Rishonim, one can still perform mehadrin.

Reb Shach, in his sefer on the Rambam (Hilchos Chanukah), takes issue with the comparison that the Brisker Rav drew from bris milah. The mehadrin that is associated with the mitzvah of bris milah, and most other mitzvos, is to beautify the mitzvah. For example, regarding the mitzvah of lulav, in order to fulfill mehadrin one must have a nice lulav. It is regarding this form of mehadrin that the Rishonim have a disagreement as to whether it can be performed after one has fulfilled the mitzvah. However, the mehadrin that is associated with the mitzvah of Chanukah is completely different. It is not to perform the same action in a more beautiful manner, but rather it is to do a completely separate action – namely to add more candles. Regarding this form of mehadrin we do not find that any of the Rishonim suggest that one cannot perform mehadrin after the basic mitzvah is fulfilled, since the mehadrin requires a separate action.

I believe that there is evidence that this mehadrin is different from the usual mehadrin. Concerning the usual mehadrin, one is not required to spend more than a third of the value of the basic mitzvah. But regarding the mehadrin of the mitzvah of Chanukah, one is required to spend more than a third of the basic mitzvah (i.e. if there are more than three members in the household, and from the fourth night on when one must spend more than a third of the basic mitzvah.

A freilichen Chanukah

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vayaitzai

Is Ma'ariv Really Optional?

In the beginning of this week's parshah the Torah writes about Yakkov Avinu's departure from his father's house in Bear Sheva. The passuk says "Vayifga bamakom" and he met the place. This passuk carries many deeper levels of understanding aside from the pashut pshat. Rashi explains that the "place" that the passuk is referring to is Har Hamoria. The Gemara in Chullin 91b explains that Hashem lifted the mountain and brought it to Yakkov, hence the wording "and he met the place". The Gemara in Brachos 26b explains that the word "vayifga" means to daven, and that it was at this point that Yakkov Avinu instituted the tiffela of ma'ariv.

The Gemara in Brachos 27b says that although all of the tiffelos are mandatory, the tiffela of ma'ariv is a rishus (voluntary).  Tosafos (Brachos 26a) points out that one may not decide not to daven ma'ariv unless there is an adequate reason i.e. another time sensitive mitzvah.

The Gemara in Brachos 21a discusses the halacha in a scenario where one is in middle of davening shimoneh esray and realizes that he had already davened this tiffela. The Gemara says that he should stop davening immediately, even if he is in the middle of a bracha. Even though one may daven a tiffelas nidavah (a voluntary tiffela) whenever he desires, he must stop in the middle since he initially began davening under the impression that the tiffela was obligatory. The Tosafos Harash explains that just as there are not any korbanos that are part obligatory and part voluntary so too there cannot be a tiffela that is part obligatory and part voluntary.

Based on this, the Rambam (hilchos tiffela 10:6) wrote a tremendous chiddish. He wrote that the abovementioned Gemara that discusses the halacha of when one realizes in the middle of shimoneh esray that he has davened that tiffela, should not apply when the tiffela that one is in the middle of is ma'ariv. The reason for this ruling is since the tiffela of ma'ariv is voluntary it can connect to a tiffelas nidavah.  Therefore if one was in the middle of davening ma'ariv and realized that he had already davened ma'ariv if he desires he may continue davening as a nidavah. Since both tiffelos are voluntary they should be able to connect as one voluntary tiffela.

The Ra'avad disagreed with this psak and, as explained by the Kesef Mishnah, argued that for many generations Klal Yisroel have accepted upon themselves an obligation to daven ma'ariv. Even the Rambam himself writes (hilchos tiffela 1:6) that all of Yisroel wherever they are have accepted to daven ma'ariv involuntarily. So how can the Rambam say that the tiffela of ma'ariv can connect with a tiffelas nidavah since they are both voluntary?  

Reb Chaim Solovatchik zt'l in his sefer on the Rambam suggests the following approach to understand the ruling of the Rambam: although Klal Yisroel have accepted upon themselves to daven ma'ariv involuntarily, nevertheless the type of tiffela remains the same. Since the tiffela of ma'ariv was instituted as a voluntary tiffela it remains that type of tiffela in its essence. In other words, one can have an obligation to daven a voluntary type of tiffela. The obligation to daven a particular tiffela does not affect the type of tiffela that it is in its essence. Therefore the tiffela of ma'ariv can connect with a tiffelas nidavah since they are both voluntary tiffelos in essence.

On the other hand, the Ra'avad believes that whether one is obligated to daven a certain tiffela will affect the type of tiffela that it is. Therefore since we have accepted upon ourselves to daven ma'ariv involuntarily the tiffela becomes an obligatory tiffela and can no longer connect to a tiffelas nidavah.

The Rambam (hilchos tiffela 1:10) writes that there are some Ge'onim who were of the opinion that one may not daven a tiffelas nidavah on Shabbos since we do not bring a korban nidavah on Shabbos. The implication from the Rambam is that he agrees with this view. This however raises a problem, how can one daven ma'ariv on Shabbos if according to the Rambam himself it is a voluntary tiffela in essence?

I want to suggest that although ma'ariv is a voluntary tiffela in its essence, it differs from a nidavah. The similarity that ma'ariv shares with a tiffelas nidavah is that they are both voluntary, and therefore they can be connected. However the Gemara in Brachos 26b says that all of the tiffelos correspond to different korbanos; shachris corresponds to the tamid shel shachar, mincha to the tamid shel bain ha'arbaim, and ma'ariv corresponds to the aimurim of the korbanos (which even if they are not brought the korban is effective- it is for this reason that ma'ariv is a rishus). Therefore even though ma'ariv is voluntary, it corresponds to the aimurim which are brought even on Shabbos. A korban nidavah however is not brought on Shabbos, and therefore one cannot daven a tiffelas nidavah on Shabbos.

It would appear to me that the Rambam's ruling that one may continue davening ma'ariv even if he realizes that he already did so, does not apply on Shabbos. Since one cannot daven a tiffelas nidavah on Shabbos he cannot end off the shimoneh esray with a tiffelas nidavah.  

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Toldos

How Did Yitzchak Eat From Eisav's Shechitah?

In this week's parshah we read about the berachos that Yitzchak had intended to give Eisav, but instead (unintentionally) gave to Yaakov Avinu. Yaakov was able to receive the berachos instead of Eisav because Yitzchak had requested Eisav to go out to the field and hunt game for him. This provided Yaakov sufficient time to prepare everything in order for him to receive the berachos. When Yitzchak requested of Eisav that he hunt game for him, he told him to "…sa na keilecha telyecha vekashtecha – sharpen your gear, your sword, and your bow" (Bereishis 27:3). Rashi explains that Yitzchak was telling Eisav to sharpen his knife so that he would shecht (slaughter) properly; thus the food would not be a neveilah. The Sifsei Chachamim explains that by sharpening his knife he would ensure that there were not any nicks on the knife. Regarding this pasuk, the ba'alei Tosafos and the Rush add that the word in the pasuk, "tzayid," is written with the letter "hay" although it is not pronounced. This is to inform us that Yitzchak taught Eisav the five (the numerical value of the letter "hay") halachos of shechitah that can disqualify a shechitah.

The Chasam Sofer (She'eilos V'teshuvos, Yoreh De'ah 15) asks the following question regarding Yitzchak's request to Eisav: Why did Yitzchak have to tell Eisav to sharpen his knife now? For if Yitzchak was indeed concerned that Eisav would otherwise not have sharpened his knife, how could he trust him now? And if Yitzchak felt confident that Eisav would generally check his knife, why was he compelled to remind him now? Similarly, one could ask why Yitzchak would now teach Eisav about hilchos shechitah. Shouldn't he have taught him many years earlier, as Eisav was already 63 years old at the time of the berachos? Additionally, the ba'alei Tosafos ask another question on this episode. The Gemara in Chullin 5a says that a mumar (heretic) is unfit to shecht. How then could Yitzchak have eaten from Eisav's shechitah, since the Gemara in Kiddushin 18a says that Eisav was a mumar?

            As a result of this and other questions, the Chasam Sofer disagrees with the Sifsei Chachamim, saying that Yitzchak told Eisav to sharpen his blade for a different reason other than to ensure that it did not contain nicks. He explains that the purpose of telling Eisav to sharpen his knife was to remove the fat that was remaining on the knife from the avodah zarah foods that Eisav's wives would serve. Generally this would not have prohibited the meat if it was rinsed, but since Yitzchak had asked for tzeli (roasted meat), as it was a korban Pesach, the meat would otherwise be prohibited unless the knife was cleaned via sharpening.

            I would like to suggest the following solution to explain the opinion of the Sifsei Chachamim: The Gemara in Chullin 4a says that there are two types of mumars: a mumar leteiavon – one who sins out of temptation – and a mumar lehachis – one who sins without temptation but solely to spite Hashem. The halacha that a mumar is disqualified from shechting only applies to a mumar lehachis. A mumar leteiavon may shecht, provided that a trustworthy person checks his knife. In order to shecht properly there must not be any nicks on the blade of the knife. If there is, the shechitah is invalid. Therefore one must carefully check the blade prior to shechting, to ensure that there are no nicks on the blade. Since the process of checking the blade is burdensome, we may not rely on a mumar leteiavon exerting himself and checking his knife properly. Thus if a mumar leteiavon shechts without anyone checking his blade for him, the shechitah is invalid – for we assume that he did not properly check his blade and there may have been a nick on it. However, if someone else checks the blade, a mumar leteiavon may shecht.

The Gemara in Kiddushin that refers to Eisav as a mumar does not specify which type of mumar he was. I suggest that perhaps Eisav was considered a mumar leteiavon, and not a mumer lehachis. Therefore, if someone else would check his knife for him, he would be allowed to shecht. Yitzchak knew that Eisav was outstanding in the mitzvah of kibud av (honoring one's father) and he was certain that Eisav would fulfill any of his requests. As a result, Yitzchak told Eisav now to sharpen his knife in order to be certain that he would check the blade. Yitzchak felt that the level of certainty whereby he knew that Eisav would follow his command was sufficient to ensure that the knife was checked – as if someone else actually checked it. Thus Eisav – a mumar leteiavon- was permitted to shecht.

Although Yitzchak had reason to be concerned that Eisav would not check his knife on his own since he was a mumar leteiavon, he nonetheless knew that commanding him to do so would be the equivalent of someone else checking his knife for him. This permitted the meat to be eaten. Based on this, we can also answer the question that the ba'alei Tosafos asked (how Yitzchak could have eaten from the shechitah of a mumar). Since Eisav was considered a mumar leteiavon, once his father commanded him to check his knife his shechitah was permitted.

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chaya sara

Did Avraham Already Own The Land?

In this weeks parsha we read of Avraham's purchase of M'aras Hamachpela. Prior to any negotiations Avraham said to the binai Chais "Ger t'toshav anochi" (23:4) - I am a stanger and a resident.  Rashi quotes a Medrish that explains the apparent paradox in Avraham's words as follows: Avraham was telling the binai Chais treat me like a stranger and sell me the property, and if not I will be forced to act as a resident and take what is rightfully mine. For Hashem has already said to me that this land will belong to my children. 

The Miforshim are bothered by this interpretation and ask the following question:  In parshas Lech Licha we learned of the dispute between Avraham's and Lot's shepherds. The passuk does not inform us regarding the details of the dispute, however Rashi does. Rashi says that Lot's shepards were risha'im and would allow their animals to graze in private property. Avraham's shepherds chastised them for this as it was stealing. In defense Lot's shepards responded that what they were doing was not stealing since Hashem gave this land to Avraham and Lot is his only inheritor (at the time). Rashi concludes by quoting the end of that passuk that says vihakinani vihaprizi az yoshaiv ba'aretz (and the Cinani and the Prizi were still occupying the land) indicating that Avraham had not yet acquired the land and therefore allowing the animals to graze in private property was indeed stealing.

The two explanations from Rashi seem to contradict one another. In this week's parsha he says that Avraham could take the land as its rightful owner, and in parshas Lech Licha he said that Avraham had not yet acquired the land.

The Chizkuni and the Sifsai Chachamim both suggest the following answer: Hashem promised Avraham that his children will inherit the land of Eretz Yisroel. In parshas Lech Licha Avraham had not yet had any offspring, therefore Hashem's promise did not come in to affect. In parshas Chaya Sarah, Yitzchok had already been born. Thus, Hashem's promise was applicable and Avraham could demand the land as its rightful owner. 

My rebbe, Reb Shmuel Birembaum zt"l, suggested another answer to this question, based on an explanation from the Malbimon on a different point in this episode. The Malbim explains that Avraham  Avinu intended on accomplishing more than merely acquiring a piece of land; he wanted to teach the public that there was an afterlife. The general consensus of that time was that there was nothing after one dies, and Avraham wanted to use this opportunity to teach them otherwise. With this the Malbim explains why Avraham informed them of his intentions with the field in the first place and continuously stressed and reiterated several times that he is acquiring the land for a burial; to instill in the binai Chais the belief that there is an afterlife.

Reb Shmuel proved from a Gemara in Gittin (47a) that there are two separate levels of acquisition; the monetary aspect and there is also a level of acquisition that affects issurim and mitzvos. For example if a non Jew acquires land in Eretz Yisroel he completely owns the land as far as monetary issues are concerned. This enables him to do whatever he pleases to the land. However regarding tiruma and ma'aser and other mitzvos the land is not considered owned by a non Jew which would exempt it from those mitzvos, rather it is obligated in these mitzvos since the non Jew cannot acquire the land on the level that affects mitzvos.

Now we can understand the seemingly contradictory explanations from Rashi. Regarding monetary issues Avraham had not yet acquired the land. However regarding mitzvos, Avraham had already acquired Eretz Yisroel. In parshas Lech Licha Rashi was addressing a monetary issue; i.e. whether one may allow his cattle graze in someone else's field. In that regard Rashi explained that the land belonged to the current residents of the land as Avraham had not yet acquired the land. In this week's parsha the issue at hand was relevant to mitzvos, as explained by the Malbim Avraham was using this acquisition as a means to teach the binai Chais to believe in afterlife. Thus Avraham was able to invoke his property rights as the matter pertained to mitzvos. 

I believe that Rashi in parshas Vayayra (18:17) seems to contradict pshat of the Sifsay Chachamim. Rashi says that Hashem informed Avraham of his plans to destroy Sedom because it belonged to him. At this point Yitzchok was not yet born, thus according to the Sifsay Chachamim the land did not yet belong to Avraham.  According to Reb Shmuel, Hashem wanted to inform Avraham of his plans since he owned the land regarding mitzvos.

lech licha

Why Did Avraham Not Perform A Bris Earlier?

 

In this weeks parsha Hashem commands Avraham in the mitzvah of bris milah. We once discussed a question that several achronim ask regarding this mitzvah, and I wanted to share some new thoughts on the matter. The achronim ask that the Gemaras in Kiddushin 82a and Yuma 28b say that Avraham Avinu kept the entire Torah, even though it was not yet given. Why then did Avraham not perform a bris milah on himself earlier? Why did he wait until he was commanded to do so at age 99?

The Mizrachi on this pasuk answers that the Gemara in Kiddushin 31a says that one who performs a mitzvah when he is commanded to do so is greater than one who performs it when he is not commanded. Since this mitzvah can only be performed once Avraham decided to wait until he was commanded to perform it.  

The Brisker Rav answers that Avraham kept the entire Torah even though it was not given. However certain mitzvos, due to the lack of their physical existence, were impossible for him to perform, and therefore were not considered as if he didn't perform them.

The mitzvah of bris milah is to remove the urla (foreskin). Before Avraham was commanded to perform a bris milah, there was no concept of urla. Prior to the commandment to remove the urla, there was no distinction between the foreskin and the rest of the skin, since the foreskin was not yet considered urla. Only once the Torah commanded him to remove the urla did the foreskin become urla. Thus prior to the commandment, Avraham could not perform the mitzvah of bris milah.

With this understanding we can also answer another question. The pasuk in this week's parsha (17:3) says that when Hashem spoke to Avraham regarding the mitzvah of bris milah, Avraham fell on his face. Rashi explains that this happened because he was an urel (uncircumcised male). We find that Hashem spoke to Avraham many times before this episode, so why only now did Avraham fall on his face because he was uncircumcised? According to the p'shat of the Brisker Rav, that prior to his commandment to be circumcised the foreskin was not considered urla, we can understand why Avraham never felt the need to fall on his face while talking to Hashem until this time – because before this commandment, he was not considered an urel.

Another example of a mitzvah where the concept did not exist prior to it being commanded is the mitzvah of kiddushin. Although there was a form of marriage before the Torah was given, it was of a different status. With this the Brisker Rav explains how Yaakov Avinu was permitted to marry sisters. He explains that only under the new status of kiddushin is it forbidden to marry sisters, whereas the marital status that existed prior to the giving of the Torah did not prohibit marrying sisters.

There is another answer as to why Avraham did not perform the mitzvah of bris milah prior to being commanded to do so, even though he kept the rest of the Torah. Bris milah is a bris (covenant) between two parties. Before the other party agrees to a covenant there cannot be a covenant. Therefore, prior to being commanded to perform a bris milah,

Avraham could not do so on his own – for it would not be a bris (covenant).

            The Panim Yafos (who also authored the sefer Hafla'ah) on this pasuk offers another answer to this question. He says that the prohibition of not wounding oneself extends to binai Noach as well. Therefore prior to being commanded, Avraham could not perform a bris mila on himself as it was prohibited to wound himself. He explains that this was the reason that the people of Avraham's generation protested Avraham's performing a bris, since they were not aware of the new commandment, they argued that it was prohibited. Thus Avraham had to perform the bris himself as no one else heard the commandment.

            I was bothered by the following question after reading the answer of the Panim Yafos: How is it that we are allowed to perform a bris mila today if it is in fact a violation of the prohibition against wounding oneself or another? One cannot answer that when the wound serves a purpose it is not prohibited, since in Avraham's case there was a purpose even prior to his being commanded to do so. Perhaps one could suggest that after the commandment to perform a bris mila we can apply the rule of assay docheh lo sassay and thus one may perform a bris even though he is making a wound. This would explain why Avraham could not perform a bris prior to his being commanded to do so since we cannot apply the rule of assay doche lo sassay before there was command to do that assay.    

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Yom Kippor

Asking For Forgiveness From Your Fellow

The Mishnah in Yuma 85b says that Yom Kippur can atone for one's sins; however, it does not apply to all sins equally. The Mishnah says that Yom Kippur can atone for aveiros bein adam l'Makom (between man and God), but cannot atone for aveiros bein adam l'chaveiro (between one man and another man) unless the sinner has appeased the man he wronged. This is derived from the pasuk in Vayikra 16:30, "mikol chatoseichem lifnei Hashem titharu."

The Mishnah in Baba Kama 92a says that regarding an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro, even if one returns the stolen object or repays for damages he has incurred on another, he is not forgiven until he beseeches forgiveness from his fellow. This Mishnah derives this halacha from a pasuk in Bereishis 20:7, "v'atah hasheiv eishes ha'ish…"

The Sefer Harirai Kedem asks the following question: The two Mishnayos are seemingly teaching us the same halacha, namely that in order to be forgiven for aveiros bein adam l'chaveiro one must appease his fellow. Why do the Mishnayos derive this same halacha from two different pasukim?

I had the privilege of asking my rebbe, Reb Shmuel Birenbaum, zt"l, this question before Shacharis on Yom Kippur a number of years ago, and he shared the following thought with me: According to several Rishonim, every aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro had two aspects incorporated in them: there is the bein adam l'chaveiro aspect and there is also the bein adam l'Makom aspect, since Hashem forbade this action. Therefore we need two pasukim to teach us that one is not forgiven for transgressing an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro until he has appeased his fellow – one for each aspect of the aveirah, the bein adam l'Makom and the bein adam l'chaveiro.

The Sefer Harirai Kedem offers a different approach in explaining the necessity for two pasukim. He explains that the two Mishnayos are teaching two different halachos. The Mishnah in Baba Kama is referring to the general mitzvah of teshuvah. In order to do teshuvah for an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro one must ask his fellow for forgiveness. To achieve this forgiveness, it would suffice if his fellow told him that he forgives him, except that he doesn't want to have anything to do with him anymore.

The Mishnah in Yuma, though, is referring to the atonement of Yom Kippur, whereby simply asking for forgiveness is not sufficient. In order for Yom Kippur to provide atonement for an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro, one must appease the fellow that he wronged and remove any disdain from his heart toward him – like he felt before the incident. In fact the Mishnayos are meduyak (the wording is indicative) that they are teaching these two different halachos. The Mishnah in Baba Kama says that one must be mevakesh (beseeching) from his fellow, whereas the Mishnah in Yuma says that one must be meratzeh (make himself liked by) his fellow. (I have found that this is indicative in the Rambam as well. The Rambam writes these two halachos in separate places, one in Hilchos Teshuvah and the other in Hilchos Chovel U'mazik. He preserves the same wording – "meratzeh" in Hilchos Teshuvah regarding Yom Kippur, and "mevakesh" in Hilchos Chovel U'mazik concerning the general halacha of teshuvah.)

The reason that the atonement of Yom Kippur requires that one appease his fellow more than that of the regular teshuvah is because the atonement of Yom Kippur comes about via the tzibbur, as a communal atonement. Individuals attain atonement by virtue of being members of the tzibbur (community). In fact even the karban that is brought on Yom Kippur, the se'ir hamishtale'ach, is a karban tzibbur. Thus, in order that everyone should be able to connect to the tzibbur and utilize the atonement of the tzibbur, there must not be any barriers of conflict between members of the tzibbur.

I would like to suggest another answer as to why we need two pasukim to teach us that one must ask the fellow whom he wronged for forgiveness in order to achieve atonement on an aveirah bein adam l'chaveiro. If the Torah had written only one pasuk, then all we would be able to learn from it is that as far as the mitzvah of teshuvah goes, one must ask his fellow for forgiveness, in addition to repaying him. But we would not necessarily know anything about how to attain forgiveness on Yom Kippur; in other words, we would not know that in order to be forgiven on Yom Kippur one must ask for forgiveness as well. This is because we would have thought that it is possible that one is forgiven on Yom Kippur without performing all the necessary components of teshuvah. Therefore the Torah wrote a separate pasuk, to inform us that even the atonement of Yom Kippur requires that one ask forgiveness of the fellow whom he wronged.

G'mar chasimah tovah.

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sorry its late, but better late than never

The Teshuvah Of Rosh Hashanah

There is a famous Rambam in Hilchos Teshuvah 3:4 that says: "Although the blowing of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah is a decree from Hashem, there is a remez (reason) behind its blowing. The reason is that the sound of the shofar is to remind us to wake up from our slumber and inspect our actions, do teshuvah, and remember our creator. And those who have forgotten the truth and wasted their time should look into their souls and inspect their way of life. They should leave the wrong path that they find themselves on". Clearly the Rambam believes that on Rosh Hashanah one should do teshuvah, as he says that the shofar is to awaken us to do teshuvah. Similarly it would seem that one should do teshuvah on Rosh Hashanah, as it is part of the Aseres Yemei Teshuvah (10 Days of Repentance).

The Rambam says in the second perek of Hilchos Teshuvah that the mitzvah of teshuvah is comprised of four components: vidui (confession), charatah (regret), azivah (stopping oneself from sinning again), and kabbalah (resolution). The Rambam also says that one must verbalize his confessions in order for it to be valid. The Achronim are bothered by the following question: Why don't we find the teshuvah process to be a part of the Rosh Hashanah davening – as we do on Yom Kippur? Similarly there is no minhag to do the teshuvah process on Rosh Hashanah. Some even have the custom to not eat foods that have the same gematria as the word "chet" (sin). So if the shofar is to remind us to do teshuvah, why don't we do any of the teshuvah process on Rosh Hashanah?

The Gemara in Kiddushin 49b says that if one says to a woman "be mekudeshes (betrothed) to me on the condition that I am a tzaddik gamur (complete tzaddik)" and she accepts, the kiddushin is valid even if he is known to be a rasha gamur (complete sinner). This is because perhaps he was meharher b'teshuvah b'libo (thinking of teshuvah in his heart). The Minchas Chinuch (Mitzvah 364) is bothered by how the kiddushin can be valid when it was contingent on the fact that the man was a tzaddik gamur, and instead he was a known rasha gamur? In order for him to become a tzaddik gamur he would have to go through the lengthy process of teshuvah that entails a verbal confession. How could he have accomplished all of that so quickly, and how did the witnesses not hear him repenting?

The Sefer Harirai Kedem and Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro explain that the teshuvah of Rosh Hashanah is different from that of Yom Kippur, and that of the mitzvah of teshuvah in general. The mitzvah of teshuvah indeed requires the abovementioned four-step process, and that is what we do on Yom Kippur as well. This form of teshuvah atones for and wipes clean one's sins. However, on Rosh Hashanah we do not do teshuvah on individual sins; rather, as the Rambam said earlier, the teshuvah is to awaken us from our sleep, remember our Creator, look into our souls, stop wasting our time with nothingness, and leave the wrong path as we return to the right path. With the teshuvah of Rosh Hashanah, one does not remove any of his individual sins; instead he changes his life's path, and his outlook and direction. Rosh Hashanah, the beginning of the 10 Days of Repentance, is the first step in the teshuvah process of the 10-day period. The days following Rosh Hashanah are focused on the mitzvah of teshuvah for individual sins – with Yom Kippur as the climax.

With this, the Sefer Harirai Kedem explains the Gemara in Kiddushin that is mentioned above. With the form of teshuvah that we do on Rosh Hashanah, a person becomes a tzaddik even though he has not done the mitzvah of teshuvah to remove his sins. Once he awakens from the wrong path and is determined to start following the right path, he attains the status of a tzaddik. Therefore, when the individual proposed kiddushin on condition that he is a tzaddik gamur, we can assume that perhaps he had this form of teshuvah in mind, namely to change direction – which does not require anything verbal and is not lengthy. Thus the kiddushin is valid, as he attained the status of a tzaddik even though he still has not atoned for his sins.

The Kotzker Rebbe suggested another explanation as to why the kiddushin is valid in the abovementioned Gemara in Kiddushin. We know that a chassan attains atonement of all of his sins without even doing teshuvah. Therefore, when one does kiddushin on condition that he is a tzaddik gamur, the kiddushin is valid since he will become a tzaddik gamur together with becoming a chassan.

G'mar chasimah tovah.

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kiseyvas Sefer Torah

The Mitzvah To Write A Sefer Torah

In this week's parshah the Torah writes:  "V'atah kisvu lachem es ha'shirah ha'zos…" – And now, write for yourselves this song (Devarim 31:19). Rashi explains that the song that the pasuk is referring to is the parshah of Ha'azinu. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 21B derives from this pasuk that every Jew is commanded to write an entire Sefer Torah. However, if the pasuk is referring to parshas Ha'azinu, how can the Gemara take from here a commandment to write the entire Torah?

The Rambam in Hilchos Sefer Torah 7:1 explains that since the halacha is that when one is writing Torah one cannot write only one parshah, one must write the entire Torah. Many Achronim were bothered by obvious questions. Why is it permitted to write the parshiyos for tefillin and mezuzos without writing the entire Torah? Why is it that only regarding the mitzvah of writing the song of Ha'azinu are we required to write the entire Torah?

The Chasam Sofer, in his Shailos U'teshuvos (Yoreh De'ah 254), answers that the Beis Yosef (in Orach Chaim 49) says that the reason why one is prohibited from writing only a single parshah of the Torah is because we derive many halachos from the juxtaposition of the parshiyos of the Torah. If one would write only a single parshah, one would not be able to properly learn from such a script. When the Torah commanded us to write the shirah, the aforementioned pasuk in Devarim 31:19 continues, "…v'lamdah es Bnei Yisrael simah b'fihem…" – and teach it to the Bnei Yisrael, place it in their mouths. Since the purpose of the mitzvah of writing the shirah of Ha'azinu is for us to learn from it, it must be written together with the rest of the Torah. The parshiyos of tefillin and mezuzah are not intended for one to learn from; rather, those parshiyos remain concealed. Therefore, regarding those mitzvos, one is permitted to write a single parshah without writing the entire Torah.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, zt"l, suggests another answer to the above question. When one is writing the parshiyos for tefillin and mezuzos, the writing is not the same as when one generally writes Torah. The halacha that one may not write only one parshah only applies when one is writing Torah generally. When one is writing a parshah for tefillin or mezuzah, he is permitted to write a single parshah because he is not writing Torah for the sake of writing Torah. Rather he is writing for a specific purpose, namely tefillin and mezuzah. As opposed to when one is writing the parshah of Ha'azinu, there is no specific mitzvah that he is writing for. Instead it is considered regular writing of Torah, which is subject to the halacha of not writing Torah as single parshiyos.

The Shagas Aryeh in siman 34 asks another interesting question on the abovementioned Rambam. The Rambam said that since one cannot write Torah in single parshiyos, we must write the entire Torah. The Shagas Aryeh asks, "Does the reason that we cannot write single parshiyos so change the actual mitzvah that now the mitzvah is to write the entire Torah? Or does the mitzvah remain to only write the parshah of Ha'azinu, and one only must write the entire Torah so as not to transgress the prohibition of writing Torah as single parshiyos. One difference between these two options is that if one transgressed and wrote only the parshah of Ha'azinu, would he have fulfilled the mitzvah of kisvu … es ha'shirah ha'zos? Another difference is, if one had written the entire Torah and then everything except for parshas Ha'azinu became erased or torn. If the mitzvah remains to write only the parshah of Ha'azinu in these cases, one would have fulfilled his obligation in the mitzvah. If the Torah had intended for us to figure out, based on the prohibition to write single parshiyos, that the mitzvah is actually to write the entire Torah, one would have not fulfilled his obligation in these cases.

The Shagas Aryeh concludes that the Rambam's wording is indicative of his understanding that the actual mitzvah was to write the entire Torah. Additionally, the Sefer Hachinuch, from where he quotes the Rambam, only quotes that one is obligated to write the Torah in its entirety – and neglects to quote the reason why one cannot write single parshiyos. This would indicate that the Chinuch understood that the Rambam was of the opinion that the prohibition to write single parshiyos was merely an indication for us to understand that the mitzvah was not to write parshas Ha'azinu alone; rather we are to write the Torah in its entirety. Therefore the Chinuch did not deem it necessary to inform us how we know that the mitzvah includes the entire Torah, since it is not part of the actual mitzvah. As a result, according to the Rambam, if one wrote only parshas Ha'azinu, or only parshas Ha'azinu remained from the entire Torah, he would not have fulfilled his obligation in this mitzvah.

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Ki Savo - Arvus: Does It Apply to Women

In parshas ki savo we read that Moshe divided the Binai Yisroel to receive brachos and klalos. He set six tribes on Har Grizim and six tribes on Har Aival, with the Kohanim, Leviyim, and the Aron in the valley. He told the Kohanim and leviyim to turn towards har Grizim and recite a blessing (i.e. Blessed is the man who does not make an idol…) and everyone should answer “Amen”. Then the Kohanim and Leviyim would turn towards har Aival and recite a klala (such as Accursed is the man who makes an idol…) and everyone would say “Amen”. The Gemarah in Sota 37b derives from this parsha the concept of arvus (responsibility)- that each member of klal Yisroel is responsible for the other members’ obligations.

One common application of the concept of arvus is found in the Gemarah in Rosh Hashana 29a. Generally one can only perform a mitzvah and make a bracha on it when he is obligated in it. Once he fulfills his obligation in the mitzvah he can no longer recite a bracha over its performance since he is no longer obligated in it. The Gemarah says that one can perform a mitzvah and recite a bracha on behalf of another person and fulfill his obligation in the mitzvah for them even though he has already fulfilled his own obligation. Rashi explains that this is because all of Klal Yisroel are araivim one to each other regarding their obligation in mitzvos. The Ran there adds that since we are all araivim for each other, even though one person has already performed his mitzvah, as long as another person has not yet fulfilled his mitzvah it is considered as if the first one has not yet completely fulfilled his obligation in the mitzvah. Therefore he can perform the mitzvah with on his friend’s behalf even with a bracha.

The Gemarah in Brachos 20b discusses whether a woman is obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa (from the Torah) or only midrabanan (from the Rabanan). The Gemarah says that if she is only obligated midrabanan she cannot recite brchas hamazon for a man who is obligated midoraisa. The R’Osh explains that this is because women are not included in arvus with men. There is a machlokes regarding the correct intent of this R’Osh.

The Dagol Mirvavah (written by the Nodeh B’Yehuda) takes the R’Osh literally; that women are not included in arvus with men. Rabbi Akiva Aiger understands that the R’Osh was only referring to the mitzvah of birchas hamazon. The R’Osh was discussing the opinion that said that women were not obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa. According to that opinion the R’Osh explained that women would not be included in the arvus with men who were obligated in the mitzvah of birchas hamazon midoraisa and thus would not be able to recite it on their behalf. However regarding all other mitzvos that women are obligated in, they would be included in the arvus with men.

One application of this machlokes is regarding Kiddush on Friday night. Once one has davened ma’ariv he has already fulfilled his obligation of kiddush midoraisa, since he mentioned ‘mikadesh hashabbos’ in his davening. However he is still obligated to recite kiddush again over a cup of wine midrabanan. Women are obligated in the mitzvah of kiddish midoraisa. When a man comes home Friday night after davening he is no longer obligated in the mitzvah of Kiddush midoraisah. His wife on the other hand (if she has not davened) is obligated in the mitzvah of kiddish midioraisa. The Dagol Mirvava says that in the view of the R’Osh, the husband would not be able to be motzi his wife in kiddish since she is not in arvus with him. Only if he had not davened, and thus was still obligated in the mitzvah midoraisa would he be able to be motzi her without arvus since he is obligated in the mitzvah on his own.

Rabbi Akiva Aiger argues that regarding the mitzvah of kiddush men and women are both included in arvus and therefore even if a man has already fulfilled his obligation he can still recite kiddish on behalf of a woman who is obligated midoraisa.

Additionally Rabbi Akiva Aiger points out that if the woman would merely say “Gut Shabbos” she would have fulfilled her obligation of kiddush midoraisa as well. Therefore even according to the Dagol Mirvava that they are not included in arvus together, after she says gut Shabbos, a man would be able to recite kiddish on her behalf.

{R.F.}

Eikev -

The Gemarah in Minachos 43b cites a Braisah that says: Reb Meir says one is obligated to make 100 brachos daily as it says in this week’s parsha (10:12) Ma Hashem Elokecha shoel ma'imcha. Rashi on the Gemarah explains that we read the word “ma” as “meah” which means 100; so that the passuk reads as follows: "One hundred (daily brachos) is all that Hashem asks of you". Tosafos explains that we derive this obligation from the fact that there are 100 letters in this passuk when you read the word “ma” as “meah” (with the additional aleph). The BaHaG goes so far as to count this obligation amongst his count of 613 mitzvos!

Generally we assume that this obligation is upon each person to recite 100 brachos throughout his day. However it appears that some Rishonim understand that this is not merely an obligation on the individual, rather the mitzvah was intended for the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom (daily order) in which the avodas hayom constitutes 100 brachos.

We find this concept in the Kol Bo siman 8. The Rambam says that maariv is a rishus (optional). The Kol Bo asks how can it be optional when the 24 brachos contained in maariv (5 of shima and 19 of shimoneh esray) are part of the count of the 100 brachos? The Kol Bo argues that maariv is not optional rather the meaning of "r'shus" is that one has the option to recite shimoneh esray before shkiya (sunset).

The Kol Bo’s question on the Rambam can only be understood if we explain that his view of the meah brachos was meant for the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom of brachos. Then he can ask how could maariv be optional leaving a deficit in the seder of 100 brachos.

With this explanation we can understand why the Gemarah in Minachos felt the need to calculate where one should make up the missing brachos on Shabbos and Yom Tov, when the shimoneh essray is shorter. The gemarah instructs that one should smell good spices and eat sweets and recite their brachos. Why does the Gemarah need to find solutions for us? Couldn’t we have figured out how to total 100 brachos on our own?

However, according to our understanding of the Kol Bo, we can assume that the Gemarah is establishing the brachos of smelling spices and tasting treats as the seder hayom for Shabbos and Yom Tov!

With this we can also understand the p’sak of the Sh'lah (maseches Yoma) that on Yom Kippor there is no obligation to recite 100 brachos. If the obligation to recite 100 brachos was on the individual, then why should his individual duty be different on Yom Kippor? Even if one cannot eat or drink, he should find other ways to ensure that he recites 100 brachos! However if the halacha was for the Rabanan to establish an avodas hayom of 100 brachos, then we can understand that  Yom Kippor may have different seder hayom.

Taking this a step further, perhaps we can say that according to the Kol Bo and Sh'lah, women may be exempt from this obligation. Since women are not obligated in various different brachos of the general seder hayom (such as tallis, tiffilin, maariv, and krias shima) the avodas hayom of meah brachos may not pertain to them.

With this we can answer a question that is asked regarding the origin of the halacha to recite 100 brachos. The Medrash in Bamidbar Raba (18 :21)and the Tur Orach Chaim (siman 46) say that in Dovid Hamelech’s time every day 100 people would die and no one knew why. As a result Dovid Hamelech instituted that everyone must recite 100 brachos daily. There seems to be in contradictionwith the Gemarah in Minachos says that Reb Meir derived this mitzvah from a passuk without any mention of Dovid Hamelech.
With approach above, I want to suggest that Dovid Hamelech made an obligation on the individual to recite 100 brachos every day. One could choose to make whichever brachos he would please. The halacha mentioned in the Gemarah in the name of Reb Meir is the obligation on the Rabanan to establish a seder hayom by which one should follow and recite the specific 100 brachos.

Enjoy the seder hayom of Shabbos! {R.F.}

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Mass'ei - Yishuv Eretz Yisrael

In this week’s parsha we learn the mitzvah of yishuv eretz yisroel. The passuk says vihorashtem es haaretz viyishavtem bah - you shall possess the Land and settle in it (33:53). The Ramban in his commentary on chumash explains that here the Torah is commanding us in a mitzvas assay to inherit and dwell in Eretz Yisroel. Similarly the Ramban counts this mitzvah in his count of mitzvos assay (number 4 of the mitzvos that the Rambam did not count).

There is an interesting discussion about the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel regarding where and when it can apply.

There are two unique aspects of Eretz Yisroel. One is that it is intrinsically holy. The second is that there are several mitzvos that only apply in Eretz Yisroel. For example terumah, maaser, and most other mitzvos pertaining to things that grow on the ground. The holiness of Eretz Yisroel exists as result of the promise that Hashem made to the Avos that He would give their children Eretz Yisroel. The mitzvos which are unique to Eretz Yisroel only apply when b’nai yisroel conquer the land. Even if they conquer a land that was not part of the originally ‘Promised’ Land, it will become obligated in the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel such as terumah and maser.

The intrinsic holiness of Eretz Yisroel obligates us in a different manner. The Gemarah at the end of Kesubos (110b) discusses various halachos pertaining to Eretz Yisroel and the benefits of living there. For example, one may not leave Eretz Yisroel except under certain circumstances. Also, a husband or wife that desires to live in Eretz Yisroel can force their spouse to move to Eretz Yisroel. The benefits may apply to one who lives in Eretz Yisroel and even to one who is just buried there. The Gemarah informs us that one who lives in Eretz Yisroel has his avairos forgiven, and the Gemarah further relates how the Amoraim would kiss the stones of Eretz Yisroel, and roll in its dirt.

These halachos and benefits result from the intrinsic holiness of Eretz Yisroel due to the promise made to the Avos.

Since these two aspects of Eretz Yisroel are brought about by different causes, they can be mutually exclusive. There can be a place that has only the holiness of Eretz Yisroel without the mitzvos normally associated with Eretz Yisroel. Similarly there can be a place is that is obligated in the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel while it does not possess the intrinsic holiness of other areas in Eretz Yisroel.

The Gemarah in Gittin 8b discusses the status of a land that a king of Yisroel conquers in an improper maner , for example according to Rashi if the king conquered the land for his own purposes not for the general public. The Mahari Korkus (Rambam hilchos terumos 1:2) explains that the discussion in the Gemarah concerning the status of such land is only with regards to the mitzvos that are applicable in Eretz Yisroel, however if part of the promised land is conquered in an improper manner it nevertheless remains holy. Therefore if a king improperly conquered a part of Eretz Yisroel which was promised to the Avos, it would not be obligated in mitzvos associated with Eretz Yisroel. However it would retain its holiness and the halachos & benefits pertaining to living in Eretz Yisroel would still be applicable.

The Radvaz (Rambam hilchos terumos 1:4) says that any land outside the borders of the original promise, (even if it was conquered properly) will only be considered Eretz Yisroel regarding mitzvos, however it will not receive the holiness of Eretz Yisroel.

It is unclear whether the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel is applicable only when the other mitzvos are applicable, or if it is dependent on the holiness of Eretz Yisroel regardless if it obligated in other mitzvos. The Gemarah in Gittin 8b says that one may transgress the rabanan prohibition of amirah l’akum on shabbos (ordering a goi to do a melacha) and order a goi to write a document for the acquiring a house in Suria because of mitzvas yishuv Eretz Yisroel. This is a clear indication that the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel applies even to land outside of the land promised to the Avos, since Suria was not part of the Promised Land.

The Gemarah in Yevamos 64a says that Avraham Avinu fulfilled the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel. Clearly the b’nai yisroel had not conquered Eretz Yisroel at that time. This indicates that although the land had only the holiness set forth by the promise to the Avos one is obligated in the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel.

We can conclude that the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel seemingly applies both to a land that has only the holiness of Eretz Yisroel, and to a land that only has the obligations of the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel.

May we all be zocheh... B'Karov. {R.F.}

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Pinchas - Kana'us and Kehunah

This week’s parsha begins with the reward that Pinchas received for killing Zimri. Hashem gave Pinchas a bris of shalom and of kehuna that he and his descendents would be kohanim.

The Gimorah in Zivachim 101b brings a machlokes as to whether Pinchas was a kohen from before this episode or not. According to one opinion although Aharon and his sons had already become kohanim, until this episode Pinchas was not a kohen even though he was a grandson to Aharon Hakohen because kehunah was only given to Aharon and his sons and all future generations from then on; excluding those that were already born. According to the opinion that Pinchas was not a kohen prior to this episode we understand that this is when he did become a kohen. However according to the opinion that he was already a kohen why does the Torah say that he was made a kohen in reward for his act of killing Zimri?

The Moshav Zikainim L’balai HaTosafos offers an answer to this question. They say that although Pinchas was a kohen prior to this act he actually lost his kehunah through this act of killing Zimri. As the Gimorah in Birachos 32b says that a kohen who kills is passul (unfit) to duchen. Therefore when Pinchas killed Zimri he became passul for kehunah, creating the necessity for a new kehunah.

The Moshav Zikainim adds that Reb Yichiel of Paris fundamentally disagreed with this answer. Reb Yichiel said that Pinchas did not lose his kehunah when he killed Zimri since the halacha is that a kanoi (a zealot) can kill someone who does an avaira with a goi in public, the one performing the avaira is considered a gavra kitaila (a dead man). A kohen who kills a gavra kitaila does not lose his kehunah. Since the man is already considered dead it is not considered as if the kohen killed him. (The Moshav Zikainim does not quote how Reb Yichiel answers the original question of why was it necessary to make Pinchas a kohen since he already was a kohen.)

It seems that the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel argue about the nature of the right of the kanoi to kill the one performing the avaira. The Balai Tosafos are of the opinion that when the kanoi kills the one performing the avaira it is considered retzichah (murder) and therefore if he was a kohen he would lose his kehunah. Reb Yichiel is of the opinion that it is not considered retzichah when a kanoi kills the one performing the avaira since he is considered dead already.

Perhaps we can say that the underlying machlokes is whether the one performing the avaira is chaiv misa (has a judgment punishable with death) except that instead of bais din killing him the Torah appointed all kanoim to carry out the judgment, or there is no chiyuv misa on him, rather the Torah allowed kanoim to murder under such circumstances. The Balai Tosafos that say that it is considered murder when a kanoi kills, support the notion that there is no judgment of death against the one performing the avaira, therefore it is considered murder. Reb Yichiel who said that it is not considered murder would support the idea that there is a chiyuv misa against the one performing the avaira, therefore he is considered a gavra kitaila (dead man).

Besides for the difference of whether a kohen will become unfit for the avoda if he kills one doing such an avaira, there is another difference between the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel. The halacha is that if one does something for which he will be deserving misa (the death penalty) and and the same time he also became obligated in a monetary debt, he is exempt from the monetary obligation. This is known as kim lay bidiraba minay. There is a question as to whether or not we can apply this rule to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, as a kanoi can kill him. Reb Akiva Aiger in Kisubos 29a is of the opinion that we do apply kim lay bidiraba minay to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, and he will be exempt from any monetary obligations that occur during the avaira.

Apparently Reb Akiva Aiger agrees with Reb Yichiel that there is a chiyuv misa on such a man. Whereas according to the Balai Tosafos that said that there is no judgment of death against one who does an avaira with a goi in public, rather the Torah granted permission to kanoim to kill them, we would not apply the rule of kim lay bidiraba minai in this case and he would be obligated to pay for any monetary obligations that occur during the performance of the avaira.

{R.F.}

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BALAK - Was Pinchas A Rodef?

At the conclusion of the parsha we learn of the episode involving Pinchas when he zealously avenged Hashem’s vengeance from upon the b’nai yisroel. Zimri, who was the nassi of shevet Shimon (or only of a bais av), had performed an avaira with a Midianite woman in public. The halacha states that in such circumstances a kanoi (zealot) can kill the one doing the avaira, in an effort to avenge Hashem’s vengeance. If one is not a kanoi or he is not acting to avenge Hashem’s vengeance he may not kill the one performing the avaira. In addition, a kanoi may only kill the transgressor while he is performing the avaira. Once thed sinner is no longer engaged in the avaira, he may not be killed even by a kanoi. The Torah testifies that Pinchas was indeed acting to avenge Hashem’s vengeance when he killed Zimri.

The Gimora in Sanhedrin 82 says that although Pinchas had the right to kill Zimri he nonetheless was considered a rodef (one who is pursuing another with intention to kill him). Since the halacha is that everyone can kill a rodef, had Zimri prompted and killed Pinchas instead he would not have been penalized for murder.

The sefer Kli Chemda (parshas Balak ; 4) asks the following question: the Gemara in Sanhedrin 74 says that although everyone may kill a rodef, if it is possible to save the one being chased without killing the rodef one may not kill the rodef. For example if one can injure the rodef (and that would suffice in preventing him from killing the pursuant) he must do so, and may not kill the rodef. In the case of Pinchas and Zimri, Pinchas was the rodef and Zimri was the being pursued. The Gemara says that Zimri the sinner, was allowed to kill Pinchas, as Pinchas himself was a rodef. However there should have been a clear alternative to killing that would have been sufficient to prevent Pinchas from killing the pursuant- if Zimri would stop performing the avaira, then Pinchas would have ceased pursuing Zimri! Why does the Gemara say that Zimri could have killed Pinchas when there was a way to prevent the pursuit without spilling blood?

The Kli Chemda is assuming that when the Gemara said that Pinchas assumed the status of a rodef the Gemara’s intention was to equate him to all other rodfim. However we do find that there is a difference between the status of rodef that Pinchas attained and that of a regular rodef. The M’eri in Sanhadrin 82 says that no one aside from Zimri was allowed to kill Pinchas. With regard to a regular rodef , anyone who can prevent the murder must do so even if they must take the life of the rodef. Clearly the M’eri understood that the status rodef that Pinchas attained was different than that of a regular rodef.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro zt”l explains the difference between Pinchas and a regular rodef as follows: Pinchas was called a rodef even though Zimri was doing an avaira that he should be killed for because there is no obligation in bais din to kill him. The Torah granted permission to any kanoi to kill anyone who performs such acts. However the kanoi is acting outside of bais din and there is no judgment of death against the person. Although he has permission from the Torah to kill, bais din must view him as someone pursuing to kill another innocent man. Therefore when a kanoi pursues a perpetrator he will attain a status of a rodef.

However there is a difference between a rodef after an actual innocent man and a rodef after a man whom he has permission to kill. The reason that everyone may kill a rodef who is chasing an innocent man, is in order to save the victim’s life. The Torah therefore puts the victim’s life before the rodef’s and so anyone may protect the victim by killing the rodef. In the case of Pinchas and Zimri, the victim was Zimri. The Torah would not allow anyone to kill Pinchas in order to save Zimri, for Zimri was punishable by death. However the Torah still allows the one doing the avaira to kill the kanoi as a means of self defense.

The halacha that if one can prevent the rodef from killing the victim without killing the rodef then he must take those measures, only applies to a regular rodef where the purpose of killing the rodef is to save the victim. When we are looking to save a victim we also must try to save the rodef if possible. Whereas by a kanoi who is chasing one doing this avaira, the one doing the avaira does not need to take precautionary measures not to kill his rodef since the reason he is allowed to kill him is not in order to save the victim.


{R.F.}

Chukas - Why A Dead Person Is Mitamai

In this week’s parsha we learn that when a person dies he is mitamai. There is a machlokes regarding the reason for this tumah. The Ramban in the beginning of this week’s parsha explains that when a person dies by means of the malach hamaves (angel of death) he is mitamai. However if one dies by means of nishika (a form of death performed by Hashem and not the malach hamaves) he will not be mitamai. It is for this reason that chazal said that tzadikim do not become tamai in their death, since presumably they died by means of nisheka. The Avnai Nezer (yorah deah 466) adds that Reb Chaim Vital says that the malach hamaves sprinkles three 'bitter drops' on a person when he comes to kill him, and those 'drops' are what create the tumah.

The Or Hachaim has a different understanding of why a dead person becomes tamai. He explains that since we accepted the Torah every Jew is on a high level of kidusha. All of the forces of tumah are constantly anticipating and eagerly awaiting a chance to cling to the kidusha. As soon as a person dies the forces of tumah are able to enter the body and thus the person is tamai. He explains that it is for this reason that goy does not become tamai when he dies; since in his life he was desolate of kidusha the forces of tumah are not interested in entering the body. The Or Hachaim explains that with this understanding we can answer the question of the wording of the passuk “Zos chukkas haTorah”, why does the Torah refer to the mitzvah of tumah as the chok of the Torah. Since tumah only sets in as a result of being on a high spiritual level and the Torah is the means by which b'nai yisroel were elevated to the higher level of kidusha, the Torah refers to this mitzvah as the chok of the Torah. The Avnai Nezer cites a Zohar that seems to be in accordance with the reason given by the Or Hachaim.

The Avnai Nezer, cited above, says that there is a halachic difference between the opinion of the Ramban and Reb Chaim Vital, and the opinion of the Or Hachaim. The Zohar says that only one who dies naturally is killed by the malach hamaves, all those who are killed by others are not killed by the malach hamaves. Based on this, according to the Ramban who said that tumah only sets in when the malach hamaves kills, when one is killed by another he should not be tamai.

It is unclear if kivrai tzadikim (graves of tzadikim) are mitamai or not and whether a kohen can visit such places. According to the opinion of the Ramban who said that a dead person is only mitamai when the malach hamaves kills him, tzadikim may be mitamai when they die. Since the Gimorah in Moed Katan says that there were many tzadikim who died by means of the malach hamaves and not nisheka.

On the other hand according to the Or Hachaim who said that a dead person is mitamai as a result of the forces of tumah attempting to attach to the kidusha, perhaps when a tzadik dies he will not be mitamai. While a person is alive the forces of tumah cannot set in because the kiddusha is present and does not allow the tumah in. after he dies the tumah can now enter. However regarding a tzadik even his body becomes kaddosh and remains kadosh even after his death. Therefore the forces of tumah cannot enter even after he dies, for kisusha still remains.

Tosafos in Baba Mitzeya 114b cites a Medrash Yalkut in Mishlei that says that Eliyahu Hanavi and Reb Yehoshua (a talmid of Rebi Akiva) were burying Rebi Akiva. Reb Yihoshua asked Eliyahu Hanavi how is it that you can burry a dead person when you are indeed a kohen? Eliyahu Hanavi answered that talmidai chachamim and their talmidim are not mitamai. Tosafos says that Eliyahu Hanavi only answered what he said out of respect for Rebi Akiva, because the actual reason that Eliyahu Hanavi was allowed to burry Rebi Akiva was since Rebi Akiva was put to death by the malchus, no one would dare bury him. Therefore he had the status of a mais mitzvah for which a kohen is allowed to be mitamai. Apparently Tosafos holds that we paskin that tzadikim are mitamai.

The Gemarah in Baba Basra 58a says that Reb Binuh was setting markings of graves so no one would be mitamai. The Gemarah says that he went to miaras hamachpela to mark where the graves actually were. Some want to use this as a source that tzadikim are mitamai, since their graves had to be marked. However the Minchas Elazar (3:64) says that we cannot deduce anything from this Gemarah. Because the Gemarah in Sota 13 says that Chushim the son of Dun decapitated Esav and his head rolled into Miaras Hamachpela and was buried there. Since Esav was a Jew as the Gemoarah in Kiddushin 18a says, therefore he would be mitamai and it was for him that Reb Binuh felt necessary to mark Miaras Hamachpela.

{R.F.}

Korach

In this week’s parsha we learn of the rebellion of Korach. At the end of the first pasuk Rashi tells us that Korach and his assembly, in an effort to undermine Moshe Rabainu’s authority, came before Moshe Rabbenu wearing garments that were comprised completely of t'cheiles and asked “Is a talis that is made completely of t'cheiles obligated to have t'cheiles in the tzitzis as well or not?” Moshe answered them that it is indeed obligated. The assembly started laughing at Moshe, and argued that if a talis of a different material only requires one string of t'cheiles for it to be exempt from its obligation of t'cheiles, certainly a garment that is made of t'cheiles should exempt itself. The Medrash Hagadol informs us of the rest of the dialog between Moshe and Korach and his assembly. The Medrash says that Moshe answered Korach with the following question: is a house full of seforim obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah or not?” Korach answered that it is obligated. To which Moshe responded that just as a house full of seforim is obligated in the mitzvah of mezuzah so too a garment comprised only of t'cheiles is still obligated in the mitzvah of t'cheiles in the tzitis.

There are several points in the exchange between Moshe and Korach that are perplexing. Why did Korach only ask that a garment which is completely comprised of t'cheiles should be exempt from its obligation of t'cheiles? Why didn’t he ask that a garment that is completely white should exempt itself from the obligation to put white strings on the garment? Another question is, the mitzvah of t'cheiles is to attatch a string of t'cheiles to a garment, how can Korach suggest that one fulfill his obligation in any other fashion? Also why did Korach use the terminology of a garment becoming exempt from its obligation, the focus should have been on the person- has he fulfilled the mitzvah with such a garment or not.

The Kesef Mishnah in hilchos Teffilin (1:11) cites a Rambam in teshuvos that explains that with regard to the mitzvah of mezuzah the mezuzah is not the mitzvah, rather the house is obligated to have a mezuzah on it. When there is no house there is no obligation of mezuzah. Obviously there is no obligation on the house for it is inanimate; however the Rambam means the person is obligated to ensure that his house has a mezuzah. Therefore the house is what obligates one to put up the mezuzah.

When one puts a mezuzah on his house he has exempt his house from obligating him in the mitzvah of mezuzah. Similarly, a four cornered garment obligates anyone who wears it to put on a string of t'cheiles. When one attaches a string of ticheles to the garment he has exempt the garment from obligating him in t'cheiles, hence the terminology of exempt applies to a garment and a house.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro zt”l explains that it appears from the Rambam (hilchos tzitis 1:3) that there is a difference between the mitzvah of white strings and the t'cheiles string.

The Rambam writes that there are two parts to the mitzvah of tzitis, the corners should have white strings coming out of them and that you should attach a string of t'cheiles to the corner. Seemingly the mitzvah of the white strings is that the garment should have white stings coming out of its corners. The mitzvah of the white strings is a mitzvah in the garment. We could say the mitzvah of the white strings is to wear a talis mitzuyetzes “a garment with white strings”. On the other hand the mitzvah of t'cheiles is not to wear a “garment with a string of ticheles”; rather the mitzvah is to attach a string of t'cheiles to the garment. The garment is not part of the mitzvah of t'cheiles.

Obviously Korach would not ask that one should be able to perform a mitzvah not in its proper maner. However he understood that the nature of the obligation to attach a t'cheiles string was different than that of the white strings. Korach never thought to exempt a white garment from the obligation to attach white strings to it because the garment itself requires white strings to come out of its corners. Therefore even with an all white garment there still is a requirement of the garment to have white strings come out of it. He only thought that a garment of ticheles could exempt one from his obligation to attach a string of ticheles since the mitzvah of t'cheiles is separate from the mitzvah of the garment. Korach understood that the nature of the mitzvah of t'cheiles was merely to attach a string of t'cheiles and not an integral part of the garment, as were the white strings. Therefore Korach reasoned that if the garment already contains t'cheiles it should not require any other t'cheiles attachments.

{R.F.}

Shlach - Tzitzis and Shatnez

At the conclusion of this week’s parsha the Torah commands us in the mitzvah of tzitzis. The Gimorah in Yivamos 4a learns from a drasha that one may wear shatnez (wool and linen) in his tzitzis, and that this is the source in the Torah that asay is doche losasay- the asay of tzitzis allows one to transgress the losasay of shatnez.



The Bris Avraham asks a question on the Gimorah based on the following two notions: first the Gimorah in Yivamos 4b says the Torah only prohibited shatnez when the one wearing the shatnez derives a physical benefit from the garment. Second, the opinion of the Rashba in Niddarim 15a is that the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu (mitzvos were not given for pleasure purposes) dictates that any physical benefit derived from the performance of a mitzvah is not considered pleasure. Based on these premises the Bris Avraham suggests that while wearing tzitzis one will not be deriving benefit from the garment. Therefore even if the garment contains shatnez one would not be prohibited from wearing it since one is only prohibited to wear shatnez when he derives benefit from the garment. How can the Gimorah learn that asay is doche a losasay from the fact that tzitzis can be worn with shatnez, if when one wears tzitzis with shatnez there is no prohibition of shatnez at all?



The Bris Avraham answers that we only apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu if one could not perform the mitzvah in any other manner other than by trangresing the avaira. In the case of tzitzis one is not required to wear a linen garment creating a situation of shatnez. Therefore when the Torah says that we may wear linen garments with wool strings, it is not as a result of the general rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu since there is a way to perform the mitzvah without transgressing any prohibitions- a wool garment with wool strings.



The Imrai Bina (hilchos tzitzis 3) offers another answer to the question of the Bris Avraham. Mitzvos can be categorized in two groups: mitzvos in which physical pleasure is an integral part of the mitzvah for example eating, and mitzvos whose essence is unrelated to receiving any pleasure for example Tiffilin. The Rashba that we cited earlier that is of the opinion that any pleasure derived while performing a mitzvah is allowed even if it would otherwise be forbidden, only applies to the mitzvos that the pleasure is not an integral part of the mitzvah. If one derives pleasure from such a mitzvah we say he is not doing the action for the sake of the pleasure rather for the sake of the mitzvah and is therefore permitted. Whereas if the mitzvah itself requires one to receive pleasure we will not allow one to receive that pleasure from a forbidden source for he is in fact acting for the sake of the pleasure. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of tzitzis for it is a mitzvah that requires one to receive pleasure, namely the warmth of the garment.



We find this concept from the Rishon Reb Avraham Min Hahar in Niddarim 48. The Mishna says that one can prohibit one to learn Torah from his sefer by making a nedder. Reb Avraham Min Hahar asks how can one forbid one to learn Torah? Since learning Torah is a mitzvah we should apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu. He answers that we only say mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu regarding mitzvos that are primarily action based, therefore when there is any pleasure derived we can disqualify it since that is not the reason for the action. However the mitzvah of learning Torah is primarily and essentially for the sake of pleasure and enjoyment. It for that reason that an uvel (morner) is forbidden to learn Torah, as the passuk states pikudai Hashem yisharim misamchai lev. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of learning Torah since we cannot say that one is not acting for the sake of pleasure, for by this mitzvah one indeed is seeking the pleasure that accompanies the mitzvah.



I want to suggest another answer to the question of the Bris Avraham of how can we learn from the allowance of shatnez in tzitzis that asay is doche a losasay if by tzitzis there is no prohibition of shatnez since one is not deriving benefit from the garment according to the Rashba. I think that when the Rashba said that any pleasure derived from a mitzvah is not considered pleasure it was only to say that the forbidden pleasure would be permitted if derived from a mitzvah. However the Rashba would agree that there is a physical pleasure that is derived, only that it is not forbidden under theses circumstances. Therefore with regards to shatnez we only require one to derive benefit from the garment in order for it to be considered that he is wearing the garment containing shatnez. If one is not deriving benefit from a garment he is not considered wearing it. The actual pleasure is not prohibited; rather it is a precondition in wearing the garment. Although the pleasure derived while performing the mitzvah of tzitzis will be permitted it is nonetheless a pleasure and should be sufficient to consider the garment worn. Therefore even if we apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to the mitzvah of tzitzis there would still be a necessity for asay doche losasay.


{R.F.}