Tuesday, May 14, 2013

kollelh mashgiach shiur

A MODIFIED PRESENTATION MASHGIACH'S PRE SHAVUOS SHIUR AT KOLLELH

As we approach shavuos we ask how does Torah relate to ME or how can I
better relate to the Torah.

We will delve a bit into how the Torah truly (should) relates to a
person on a very, real, deeply individual level.

There is a very widespread impression (quite pronounced recently by
the Israeli Gov.) of Talmidei Chachamim as being "parasites".

This not a new phenomena. The gemara sanhedrin (99b) says that an
apikores is one who claims "mai ahani lan Rabbanan, L'didhu kari..." -
"What service do the rabbis do for us, for THEMSELVES they study!" The
gemara says this notion is actually against pessukim -"Im lo brisi
yomam valayla....& v'nasasi es kol hamakom.... - which tell us that
Torah study holds up the world & can save complete cities of sinners!

This gemara clearly teaches that Torah is not self serving, rather it
is a communal and even universal service.

This seems quite contradictory to the famous Gemara (Pesachim )about
R' Yosi's festive spirit on shavuos. As Rashi explains "I lav hai
yoma, kamma Yosi ika b'shuk" - "If not for Torah which raises me, i'd
be no different than the common Yosi."
All of humanity seeks individuality. Some feel it in their dress, some
in their car etc. These are quite shallow forms of one's unique
identity. R' Yosi was joyous in the true individuality that the Torah
brought out in himself.
Similarly, R' Sheishes would tell himself to be happy, because "lach
kra'i, lach tana'i" - "for yourself you have learned."

These stories seem to validate the 'selfish' impression the world has
of Talmidei Chachamim and seems to contradict the earlier gemara that
says torah study is a service to the world!

However the gemara itself answers, that although Torah study provides
sustenance to the entire world, "me'ikra linafshei" - the root of it
is for the person himself.

This needs explanation.

Yavo gemara shlishi L'hachri'a beineihem.... the gemara (shabbos 114a
) considers a stain on one side of a cloth a chatzitza for 'bano'im' -
Builders, which refers to Talmidei Chachamim, who, are busy building
the world all their lives.

In davening we say don't call them banayich - children of Hashem, -
rather Bonayich - Hashem's builders. What's wrong with the title
'children of Hashem'? Is that not complimentary enough?
It must be that "BUILDER" is the truer essence of the Talmid Chacham.

We can see that they build in their later years as they guide & lead
klall yisrael. But how can the gemara say they build the world "all
their lives"?!

R' Wolbe z"l answers, through Torah they Build themselves. That self
construction is what eventually builds the world.

Let me explain with an anecdote from the life of R' Wolbe himself.
When attending a conference of Rabbanim, he spent valuable time
beforehand, reading the 'program'. He explained that he was doing a
self analysis of which negative traits would be aroused when ploni
speaks on this topic & ploni on that topic. "You may ask" he'd say,
"that's nice but we're not here for that, didn't we come to solve
issues of the klall? However, let me assure you the convention in its
entirety will greatly gain from this."

The studying of Torah must relate to the real YOU. If studied
properly, it will reveal your true unique individuality, to work on,
improve and build. Only when the Torah talks to you personally, to
invoke change and development on a personal level, purifying the
negative traits, the self centeredness, and the ego, will it allow you
to build the world. It is through the personel building of character
that builds the world.

So it is true "lach kra'i, lach tana'i" the learning definitely builds
the learner. But not in a selfish, egoistic way, rather the whole
'self' building is actually for the improvement of the world at
large.

Talmidei Chachamim build the world, but every Jew is a builder as
well. Building families, - we wish a new couple that his marriage
should be a binyan adei ad and they should build a bayis ne'eman.

How many Shalom Bayis issues would not exist if only we would be
building ourselves! Working on our own 'structure' of tikkun middos
would so much help the building of a strong healthy family!

The alter of Novardik said, before he began learning mussar he used to
blame the world. Once he began mussar he shared the blame with himself
as well. "Now," he said, "I take all the blame and I see the world
favorably."

That self critique and analysis which the Torah draws out in the
individual is what allows one to truly build the world around him. Woe
is to the Israeli govt. officials who accuse the builders of the world
of being selfish. One day when they are audited for all the money they
mishandled etc. that it will be clear that "b'mumo pasal" all their
'building' of the land was for their own selfish wealth, power, or
re-election.

The Torah talks to us if we delve into it honestly and steadily. It
will reveal in ourselves our true essence, our nature, our desires,
our hopes, our faults…. We must be open to it and listen well always
checking if we are up to par with what we just learned.
With the proper "lach kra'i, lach tana'i" we can build our marriages,
families, communities, and eventually the whole world.

Sunday, May 12, 2013

Bamidbar

The Ramban asks why there was a mitzvah to count & more specifically, why the detail count?
He answers that for each person to be seen & introduced to Moshe avi hanevi'im & Aharon k'dosh Hashem, for them to place their eyes upon them with good will, this would be a zechus & source of life & blessing.... Etc.

We must realize, that these individuals, just about a year before, stood before G-D himself & heard Hashem's voice talking to them at har sinai. Wasn't that enough of a z'chus & source of blessing & life? - Imagine our children would come home one day with a direct prophcy from G-D, - Can there be anything better than that?!

The very clear message we see here is that THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS ENOUGH IN RUCHNIYUS! Especially with regard to one's hopes for his childrens' growth in spirituality. "EPPES MEHR" more & more whatever more we can hope for we must attempt.

Another thing to note, is that we're not talking about little boys being nudged by their young dreamy idealistic fathers. The youngsters in the count were 20yrs old! Chinuch doesn't stop at bar mitzvah & our aspirations for growth doesn't just apply to our kids. Its lifelong. We should continue looking out for opportunities of more kedusha, more brachah, more growth in yir'as shamayim, for our children AND ouselves as long as we're here.

In these areas there should never be enough.

Friday, May 10, 2013

Sun. night shiur

THIS SUNDAY NIGHT

COME HEAR

הר''הג ר' עזריאל ארלנגר שליטא

HaRav Ezriel Erlanger
משגיח ישיבת מיר



MATTAN TORAH
&
YOU

(IN ENGLISH)



@
9:30pm FOLLOWED BY MA'ARIV
@
KOLLEL HASHECHUNAH 1228 E 34TH ST

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

crowns of Torah and Shem tov

The Rambam in perek 3 of hilchos talmud torah details a list of
requirements for one who desires to acquire the crown of Torah. These
are different halachos not required by the actual mitzvah of talmud
torah.

What is the purpose of this crown? Who needs a crown? Is it just a way
of enticing someone to exert more effort in his learning? Is there any
concrete difference between a talmid chochom who has the crown & one
who does not?

In pirkei avos we find the mishnah making enough of an issue of the
crowns to enumerate how many crowns exist. Obviously this is not just
a way to encourage dedication to a good cause, as that would allow us
to say there are as many crowns as there are mitzvos! So what is
special about the limited 3 that are counted?

Rashi explains the source of these 3 crowns come from a remez in the
klei mishkan, where we find 3 keilim that had a zer saviv.

The maharal goes into great detail explaining the crowns' measurements
associated to the kinyanim needed for these crowns.
(mizbeach 1amah by 1 ama - 6x4 sides =24. Aron 1.5 x 2.5 - 15 +15
+9+9=48 shulchan use height 1x2 =12 & W 1.5 x2 =18 =30)

Where's keser shem tov in the mishkan? & why is it not counted as a 4th crown?

Rashi, & R' Yonah - learn that there is no such thing as a kesser shem
tov being its own crown. Rather it comes with the proper dedication to
the mission of the other 3.

This needs explanation.

A kesser is also called a nezer, or, as with the klei mishkan, a zer.
Its purpose is to set apart & estrange others from the elevated status
of the wearer.

The crowns described in the mishnah are not just trophies or 'rewards
for excellence' which can be applied to any mitzvah. Rather they are
definitive of a specifically defined level of dedication to
specifically these three missions. This explains the fact that there
are 3 crowns & no more. In all other mitzvos and occupations there is
no recommendation to be tied to that mitzvah to the extent that it
would affect one's social relationships. On the contrary, the torah
regards social relationships very highly. As the mishnah states L'olam
y'hei da'ato shel adam me'urav im habrios. eizeh hu derech
yesharah...tiferes lo min ha'adam. However, with regards to these
three missions, the tanna informs us that although one is not required
to go so far for these mitzvos, still, the extra dedication is
commendable and encouraged. The crown associated with Torah, Kehunah,
and Malchus, is worn by one who has experienced some level of
detachment from normal social life due to his dedication to these
mitzvos. He has set himself apart from the crowd in giving prime
importance to the mission at hand. Only in these three areas of avodah
is such a separation acceptable and even praised. Hence, the crowns
have a definitive meaning and they are specifically available only by
way of three clearly defined achievements.

A tremendous chidush comes to light with this understanding. One would
assume that the socially limiting dedication described here, would
naturally cause a breakdown in peoples' appreciation for the
'dedicated individual'. We would think that such a person would not
posses "tiferes lo min ha'adam" and he would certainly not be as well
liked as his peers. For this the Tanna informs us a great chidush.
Through his dedication to these three missions he will BE CROWNED AS
WELL WITH A KESSER SHEM TOV!!! True, he will have set himself
somewhat apart, but not in a negative way, rather in glory! He will
not be disliked, he will be admired! This is one amazing chidush of
our mishnah.

There is another valuable insight the mishnah teaches us here.

The only way one would attempt to achieve an elevated status of shem
tov on its own, would have to be through complete selflessness on
behalf of others. Intrinsically that cannot set him APART, rather that
unifies him with the public to the extent that he is an 'ish klall'.
While this is certainly worthy of a glorious crown no less than the
others, by nature it is impossible for there to be a kesser that
separates him from others.

talmidei r' akiva sefiras omer

In Yevamos 52b we learn about the tragic story of talmidei R' Akiva that was
due to the fact that 'lo nahagu kavod zeh lazeh? - They did not act
with honor one to another.

The Maharsha says that they verbally degraded each other & therefore
their punishment was a fatal condition associated with the mouth.
While this explains what they did wrong & the midah k'neged midah,
however the lashon of the gemara - shelo nahagu kavod - does not seem
to be a positive act of degradation, rather what they did NOT do -
shev v'al tasseh.

The untimely death of twenty four thousand torah students because of
what seems to be just a deficiency in some midas chassidus is quite
perplexing and requires study.

The gemara (kiddushin 39b) relates the story of the unnatural death of
a son who went up a tree to do shiluach hakein & bring a bird for his
father. The gemara provides a possibilty for his mid-mitzvah tragedy
because he may have sinned with thoughts of avodah zarah while doing
the mitzvah.
The Dibros Moshe states that the gemarah could not attribute his
unnatural death to improper thoughts of women, for although the
prohibition against it is d'oraisah, it still would not result in such
a death.

Similarly, from the fact the talmidei R? Akiva died the bitter &
unnatural death of ask'ra, it seems not to have been due to a lack of
midas chassidus. (One may argue on the comparison from a typical boy
to an expected level of chassidus of talmidei R? Akiva.)

The Maharsha (& others with different nuances - mishnas R? Aharon,
michtav meEliyah, maharal) learn this as a problem
in the kavod haTorah of each other. However the general 'velt? seems
to learn as the Iyun Yakov notes, that this is a story of lack of
simple bein adam l'chaveiro. Yet from the severity of punishment it
appears as a real transgression of
some issur min hadin. If this is so, it requires understanding as from
where do we find a real chiyuv of kavod to another equal Jew (not
because of his Torah) who is not a parent, Rebbi, or elder?

The gemara shabbos 31a relates the incident with the ger who ask to
learn all of Torah on one foot. Regarding the well-known response of
Hillel "mai d'alach sani l'chavrach lo savid? the maharsha points out
that this was said in the negative rather than positive form - love
your friend as yourself, because truthfully, in the positive, it's not
required to love another as much as one's self rather 'chayecha
kodmim'.
Similarly, the Ramban on the passuk ve'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
(kedoshim 19.18) says that one is not required, NOR CAPABLE, of loving
another equally with himself. However the Ramban states that although
we can't love another as much as ourselves, we are commanded against
specifically wanting another to have LESS than ourselves. What's
amazing from this Ramban is even though if you're not doing or wishing
you friend any HARM - just less massive wealth, wisdom, or blessing
than yourself, it is already transgressing this mitzvah.
The maharsha may still hold that one is able to love that much, but
definitely not commanded to do so actively. This leaves room perhaps
for the literal positive form of the passuk to be a chiyuv in the
heart and 'chayecha kodmin in ma'aseh.

On a side note, it appears from the gemara yevamos 61a that with
regards to one's wife we are capable of completely equal ahava (and
perhaps then required so as well) which goes in tandem with the fact
of ishto k'gufo ? she IS like yourself. R? Avraham Gurwitz in Toras
Avraham on Rambam Yesodi HaTorah & De'os suggests that regarding one's
wife there might not be a din of chayecha kodmin at all, as she must
be treated totally kamocha. It is interesting that one is also
encouraged to honor his wife more than himself. This may be due to the
fact that since ishto k'gufo, unless one shows a distinction between
his own honor and that of his wive's, it would be rendered self love
and he has not fulfilled the requirement of v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
in her. Certainly this distinction cannot be in the form of less
honor as that would transgress the general chiyuv of kamocha as
metioned by the Ramban above.

Please note the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos assay 206 & in hilchos de'os
6.3 seems to hold that one is capable & required
to have complete equal love for another without any limitations. The
Rambam would have to say that chayecha kodmin only applies to acts &
deeds, but the actual love & good will towards another must be equal
to oneself.

Based on the Ramban and above Maharsha (and many other classic
rishonim and achronim), we may conclude as follows. The equal love of
'kamocha? required by the Torah, is not to allow oneself priority over
his friend by treating or even FEELING towards the other any more
NEGATIVELY than toward yourself.

The question remains what kavod was demanded of talmidei R? Akiva min
hadin, that is associated with the mouth and yet that was not
fulfilled b'shev v'al ta'aseh?

Kavod takes on many forms and has various expressions. Standing up for
Talmidei Chachomim, preparing food, clothing, and escorting parents in
or out. Dressing and eating differently than normal is kavod chol
hamoed as brought by R? Yonah in Avos.

R? Shlomo Wolbe in alei shur offers an enlightening definition of the
word Kavod. It may well be 'substantial'. Kaved means
heavy, meaning containing more mass/substance. (Accordingly, kaved
rosh as opposed
to kalus rosh is a mind that is either heavy with substancial thought
or light without
substancial thought.)

There is another thing which I found to be interesting as an example
for kavod, but based on this definition it sheds a great light upon
this sugyah. The mesilas Yeshorim in perek 22 describes deeds of
anavah - humbleness. One of the manners of a humble person, is to
honor others. The prime example of this is "hevei makdim shalom l'chol
adam". At first glance this does not appear to be an act of kavod,
rather a polite manner that enhances human relationships. However, in
truth this may be Kavod in its purest & simplest form. Acting in a way
that REGARDS the SUBSTANTIAL EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER. Although this may
not fit with the classic english definition of the word kavod, however
the Ramchal clearly defines this simple act as kavod.

To understand this a bit deeper, the Maharal regarding the sugyah of
ona'as devarim (baba metziah 58b) explains that the mishnah's first
case of ona'ah is the defining example for what ona'as devarim is.
This is the case of one who asks a merchant for the price of an item
without any intention to buy it. It seems that this is ona'ah even
when the merchant doesn't realize his time time is being wasted. The
Maharal explains that this defines ona'ah, as taking advantage of
another to the point where the victim is degraded - even if just in
the eyes of the offender - to be just an object of entertainment as
opposed to a human of intrinsic value.

Perhaps we can add along these lines, that noticing another Jew and
acting as if he didn't exist, or is less "substantially existent" than
yourself, by ignoring his presence is a direct transgression of
v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha, as explained by the Ramban. This is the
minimal form of kavod due to any individual - that his existence as a
human with feelings be recognized. Hevai makdim Shalom l'chol adam may
very well be the halachically required, d'oraisah chiyuv, of kavod
that we are all commanded to do for another Jew regardless of his his
age or wisdom. This can be the shev v'al taasaeh lack of kavod that
was required of the talmidei R? Akiva min hadin. This is also a
universal form of kavod performed with the mouth, and hence the
punishment of assk"ra.


Let us all be TALMIDEI CHACHOMIM MARBIM SHALOM BA'OLAM.
----- Original Message -----

From: "dov milstein" <dovmil@gmail.com>
To: dovmil@gmail.com
Cc: ymilstein@gmail.com, rabbirfuchs@gmail.com
Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2013 2:12:26 AM
Subject: Re: kavod edit 2



In Yevamos 52b we learn about the tragic story of talmidei R? Akiva that was
due to the fact that 'lo nahagu kavod zeh lazeh? - They did not act
with honor one to another.

The Maharsha says that they verbally degraded each other & therefore
their punishment was a fatal condition associated with the mouth.
While this explains what they did wrong & the midah k'neged midah,
however the lashon of the gemara - shelo nahagu kavod - does not seem
to be a positive act of degradation, rather what they did NOT do -
shev v'al tasseh.

The untimely death of twenty four thousand torah students because of
what seems to be just a deficiency in some midas chassidus is quite
perplexing and requires study.

The gemara (kiddushin 39b) relates the story of the unnatural death of
a son who went up a tree to do shiluach hakein & bring a bird for his
father. The gemara provides a possibilty for his mid-mitzvah tragedy
because he may have sinned with thoughts of avodah zarah while doing
the mitzvah.
The Dibros Moshe states that the gemarah could not attribute his
unnatural death to improper thoughts of women, for although the
prohibition against it is d'oraisah, it still would not result in such
a death.

Similarly, from the fact the talmidei R? Akiva died the bitter &
unnatural death of ask'ra, it seems not to have been due to a lack of
midas chassidus. (One may argue on the comparison from a typical boy
to an expected level of chassidus of talmidei R? Akiva.)

The Maharsha (& others with different nuances - mishnas R? Aharon,
michtav meEliyah, maharal) learn this as a problem
in the kavod haTorah of each other. However the general 'velt? seems
to learn as the Iyun Yakov notes, that this is a story of lack of
simple bein adam l'chaveiro. Yet from the severity of punishment it
appears as a real transgression of
some issur min hadin. If this is so, it requires understanding as from
where do we find a real chiyuv of kavod to another equal Jew (not
because of his Torah) who is not a parent, Rebbi, or elder?

The gemara shabbos 31a relates the incident with the ger who ask to
learn all of Torah on one foot. Regarding the well-known response of
Hillel "mai d'alach sani l'chavrach lo savid? the maharsha points out
that this was said in the negative rather than positive form - love
your friend as yourself, because truthfully, in the positive, it's not
required to love another as much as one's self rather 'chayecha
kodmim'.
Similarly, the Ramban on the passuk ve'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
(kedoshim 19.18) says that one is not required, NOR CAPABLE, of loving
another equally with himself. However the Ramban states that although
we can't love another as much as ourselves, we are commanded against
specifically wanting another to have LESS than ourselves. What's
amazing from this Ramban is even though if you're not doing or wishing
you friend any HARM - just less massive wealth, wisdom, or blessing
than yourself, it is already transgressing this mitzvah.
The maharsha may still hold that one is able to love that much, but
definitely not commanded to do so actively. This leaves room perhaps
for the literal positive form of the passuk to be a chiyuv in the
heart and 'chayecha kodmin in ma'aseh.

On a side note, it appears from the gemara yevamos 61a that with
regards to one's wife we are capable of completely equal ahava (and
perhaps then required so as well) which goes in tandem with the fact
of ishto k'gufo ? she IS like yourself. R? Avraham Gurwitz in Toras
Avraham on Rambam Yesodi HaTorah & De'os suggests that regarding one's
wife there might not be a din of chayecha kodmin at all, as she must
be treated totally kamocha. It is interesting that one is also
encouraged to honor his wife more than himself. This may be due to the
fact that since ishto k'gufo, unless one shows a distinction between
his own honor and that of his wive's, it would be rendered self love
and he has not fulfilled the requirement of v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
in her. Certainly this distinction cannot be in the form of less
honor as that would transgress the general chiyuv of kamocha as
metioned by the Ramban above.

Please note the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos assay 206 & in hilchos de'os
6.3 seems to hold that one is capable & required
to have complete equal love for another without any limitations. The
Rambam would have to say that chayecha kodmin only applies to acts &
deeds, but the actual love & good will towards another must be equal
to oneself.

Based on the Ramban and above Maharsha (and many other classic
rishonim and achronim), we may conclude as follows. The equal love of
'kamocha? required by the Torah, is not to allow oneself priority over
his friend by treating or even FEELING towards the other any more
NEGATIVELY than toward yourself.

The question remains what kavod was demanded of talmidei R? Akiva min
hadin, that is associated with the mouth and yet that was not
fulfilled b'shev v'al ta'aseh?

Kavod takes on many forms and has various expressions. Standing up for
Talmidei Chachomim, preparing food, clothing, and escorting parents in
or out. Dressing and eating differently than normal is kavod chol
hamoed as brought by R? Yonah in Avos.

R? Shlomo Wolbe in alei shur offers an enlightening definition of the
word Kavod. It may well be 'substantial'. Kaved means
heavy, meaning containing more mass/substance. (Accordingly, kaved
rosh as opposed
to kalus rosh is a mind that is either heavy with substancial thought
or light without
substancial thought.)

There is another thing which I found to be interesting as an example
for kavod, but based on this definition it sheds a great light upon
this sugyah. The mesilas Yeshorim in perek 22 describes deeds of
anavah - humbleness. One of the manners of a humble person, is to
honor others. The prime example of this is "hevei makdim shalom l'chol
adam". At first glance this does not appear to be an act of kavod,
rather a polite manner that enhances human relationships. However, in
truth this may be Kavod in its purest & simplest form. Acting in a way
that REGARDS the SUBSTANTIAL EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER. Although this may
not fit with the classic english definition of the word kavod, however
the Ramchal clearly defines this simple act as kavod.

To understand this a bit deeper, the Maharal regarding the sugyah of
ona'as devarim (baba metziah 58b) explains that the mishnah's first
case of ona'ah is the defining example for what ona'as devarim is.
This is the case of one who asks a merchant for the price of an item
without any intention to buy it. It seems that this is ona'ah even
when the merchant doesn't realize his time time is being wasted. The
Maharal explains that this defines ona'ah, as taking advantage of
another to the point where the victim is degraded - even if just in
the eyes of the offender - to be just an object of entertainment as
opposed to a human of intrinsic value.

Perhaps we can add along these lines, that noticing another Jew and
acting as if he didn't exist, or is less "substantially existent" than
yourself, by ignoring his presence is a direct transgression of
v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha, as explained by the Ramban. This is the
minimal form of kavod due to any individual - that his existence as a
human with feelings be recognized. Hevai makdim Shalom l'chol adam may
very well be the halachically required, d'oraisah chiyuv, of kavod
that we are all commanded to do for another Jew regardless of his his
age or wisdom. This can be the shev v'al taasaeh lack of kavod that
was required of the talmidei R? Akiva min hadin. This is also a
universal form of kavod performed with the mouth, and hence the
punishment of assk"ra.


Let us all be TALMIDEI CHACHOMIM MARBIM SHALOM BA'OLAM.

Sunday, March 24, 2013

The Mitzvah of Destroying Chametz

There is a mitzvah to remove and destroy the chametz from one's possession before Pesach. This is derived from the pasuk in parshas Bo that says …tashbisu s'or mibatechem (Shemos 12:15). There are also two lavim associated with owning chametz on Pesach; bal yiraeh and bal yimatzeh.

The Minchas Chinuch discusses the following question regarding the mitzvah of tashbisu (to remove and destroy the chametz from one's possession): is the mitzvah accomplished only by actively owning chametz and destroying it, or can one fulfill the mitzvah by not owning any chametz to begin with? In other words, does one have to actively destroy the chametz or may one fulfill the mitzvah by not ever owning chametz and not lifting a finger (shev vial taaseh) to destroy it.

We find that there are mitzvos that one can fulfill without actively performing an action. On Shabbos there is a mitzvah of shabason which is a mitzvas assay that one must rest and by definition not perform any melachos. If one performs a melacha on Shabbos, aside from the lo sassay, he has transgressed the assay of shaboson. If one does not perform any melachos on Shabbos, he has fulfilled the assay of shabason. Perhaps the assay of tashbisu is the same and if one did not own any chametz before Pesach he will have fulfilled the mitzvah of tashbisu.

The other option is that the mitzvah of tashbisu is similar to that of tzitzis where if one does not have a four cornered garment with tzitzis on it he has not fulfilled the mitzvah. if one does not own a four cornered garment with tzitzis he has not transgressed the mitzvah of tzitzis however he also has not fulfilled it.

There are several differences between these two options. If there is a requirement to actively destroy the chametz before Pesach then obviously one only fulfills the mitzvah if he has chametz finds it and destroys it. this is why we place bread out before bidekas chametz, to ensure that we will have bread to destroy the next day. If there is no need to actively destroy the chametz and one can fulfill the mitzvah if he simply does not own chametz then one would not have to ensure that he has chametz to burn the next day.

Another difference is if another person grabs one's chametz and destroys it before the owner had a chance to do so. Generally, when one steals a mitzvah from another person he must pay him ten zehuvim. If the mitzvah is to actively destroy the chametz then the person who grabbed and burned the chametz would be required to pay the owner ten zehuvim. If the mitzvah is fulfilled by merely not owning chametz without actively destroying it then the person would not have to pay the owner ten zehuvim since the owner fulfilled the mitzvah the same as if he had burned it himself.

The Minchas Chinuch mentions another difference between these two options is in a scenario where one has chametz on Pesach. The mitzvah applies even on Pesach and one must destroy his chametz on Pesach as well. There is a machlokes how one must fulfill the mitzvah of tashbisu if one does have chametz. The Rabanan say that it can be performed by any means of destruction, even eating. Rabbi Yehuda says that it must be done by burning the chametz. According to the Rabbanan, if one ate his chametz on Pesach it would be a means of destruction. However if the mitzvah is only fulfilled by actively destroying the chametz this action will be considered a mitzvah habah biavera, since eating chametz on Pesach is forbidden. According to the Minchas Chinuch when one performs a mitzvah habah biavera he has not fulfilled the mitzvah. However if the mitzvah if fulfilled by simply not owning chametz then eating it on Pesach would not constitute a mitzvah habah biavera and one will have fulfilled the mitzvah of tashbisu.

The Minchas Chinuch says that it is indicative from the Chinuch that he is of the opinion that the mitzvah is fulfilled simply by not owning chametz. This is because the Chinuch says that someone who is traveling before Pesach is obligated in the mitzvah of tashbisu. The Minchas Chinuch says that if the mitzvah required an active destruction then one who would be traveling before Pesach would not be obligated in it.

Another indication that the Chinuch is of the opinion that the mitzvah of tashbisu does not require active destruction is from the fact that he says that women are obligated in the mitzvah. if the mitzvah required an active destruction then women would be exempt since it is a mitzvas assay shehazman grama (time sensitive mitzvah). However if it is not an active requirement then women would be obligated even though it is a mitzvas assay shehazman grama.

One final difference is whether one is required to have kavanah will destroying his chametz. If the mitzvah requires an active destruction then one would be required to have kavana when destroying it. if the mitzvah is fulfilled by simply not owning chametz one would not need kavanah when destroying his chamtetz.

for questions or comments email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com

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Thursday, February 14, 2013

Purim Din Smol Docheh

"Mordechai was second to the king & was well liked by most of his brethren. He seeked good for his nation & spoke with peace to all his children."

As the gemarah tells us some of his brothers were not happy about his position...

K'sav Sofer al hatorah in his drashos on the megilah explains as follows.
They wanted him to use his powerful position to force the multitudes of uncomitted 'yeshainim min hamitzvos' Jews back to observance. But he seeked a softer, though longer, approach of kindness & peace. He was successful in doing what Mt. Sinai did not. He brought the Jews to accept the Torah with love.This is how the megillah ends. Because that is why purim will continue forever.


Only G-D, the Master surgeon could foresee each 'incision' of the holocaust & deem the surgery neccessary. He also foresaw every single one of his children that would be alienated by the massive midas HaDin, & only He could deem it worthwhile.

For the rest of us, we must use din rarely & even then, only half heartedly, with our left weaker hand, perhaps the onlookers will note the true care & love within. But when din is used wholeheartedly - docheh b'shtei yadayim - it alienates not only the the one who is pushed but all the onlookers as well.

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

Reb Yisroel Salanter

Today, the 25th of Shvat, is the yur tzait of Rav Yisrael Lipkin of Salant commonly known as Reb Yisroel Salanter (1810-1883). He was born in Zager (near Kovno), Lithuania, to Rav Ze'ev Wolf Lipkin, a descendent of the Vilna Gaon.  Rav Yisrael became a close talmid Rav Zundel of Salant, who influenced him to begin the study of mussar. In 1840, he became Rosh Yeshiva of the Rameillas Yeshiva in Vilna, and later opened a yeshiva in Kovno. One of his closest talmidim, Rav Yitzchak Blazer of Petersburg commonly known as Rav Itzeleh compiled many of his teachings and memorable stories about Reb Yisroel's life in the sefer Or Yisroel. Another one of his famous talmidim was Rabbi Yaakov Yosef of New York.

Reb Yisroel was considered a Torah Giant, however he was most famously known for founding the Mussar movement. This movement focused on bettering the individual's character traits. Many of his teachings remain the basis of learning mussar today. He taught that one must endlessly strive for perfection, and must never be content with his spiritual achievements.

Reb Yisroel faced much opposition when he initially bagan teaching mussar. However his advanced level of scholarship helped him prevail and he succeeded in revolutionizing Klal Yisroel and founded the mussar movement. On one occasion Reb Yisroel was to deliver a shir to a large crowd. He had distributed mar mikomos that people could research prior to the shir. In an effort to humiliate Reb Yisroel several pranksters decided to change around the mar mikomos list and distributed a different list to the crowd. When Reb Yisroel reached the podium he noticed the switch of mar mikomos. He hesitated for a brief moment, and then preceded to deliver a new shir based on the new mar mikomos. Reb Itzeleh said that the reason why Reb Yisroel had hesitated was not because he was preparing a new shir; but rather because he was contemplating whether he should deliver the shir or not, for he feared that this feat would impress the pranksters and perhaps be considered haughty.

On another occasion Reb Yisroel was asked to deliver a shir to an audience that contained people who were opposed to learning mussar. At one point one of the big lamdanim asked a question and Reb Yisroel paused for a moment and said you are right. Rav Elya Lapyan said that although Reb Yisroel paused he nevertheless had five different answers to the question that was posed to him. However he knew that his solutions were not accurate. He also knew that if he would suggest his five solutions the one who asked the question would accept his answers because he would not know why they were not accurate. However Reb Yisroel said to himself how can I sell emes with sheker? Thus he decided not to answer the question.

 Here are a few quotes that are attributed to Reb Yisroel: "The Maharal of Prague created a golem, and this was a great wonder. But how much more wonderful is it to transform a corporeal human being into a mensch!" "A pious Jew is not one who worries about his fellow man's soul and his own stomach; a pious Jew worries about his own soul and his fellow man's stomach."

Friday, January 18, 2013

When Did Makkas Bechoros Occur?

    Dedicated to the refuah sheleimah of Shlomo Eliezer ben Chaya Sarah Elka.

There is a contradiction in the pesukim as to when makkas bechoros occurred. The pasuk in this week's parshah says, "vayehi bachatzos halailah, v'Hashem hikah kol bechor b'eretz Mitzrayim… – and at chatzos of the night, Hashem hit every firstborn in the land of Mitzrayim…" (Shemos 12:29). This pasuk states that makkas bechoros occurred by night. The implication from the pasuk in Bamidbar 8:17 is that makkas bechoros occurred by day, for the pasuk says: "b'yom hakosi kol bechor… -- on the day that I hit all of the firstborn…"

Maseches Semachos begins by posing this contradiction, and offers the following solution: Reb Yochanan says that at chatzos of the night, Hashem delivered a lethal blow to all of the bechorim that would kill them; however, they did not actually die until the morning. Hashem made it that their souls remained in them until the morning, in order that the Bnei Yisrael could witness their death.

The Peirush Nachalas Yaakov (found on the bottom of Maseches Semachos) explains why the masechta begins with this medrash. The Gemara in Sanhedrin 39a says that a min (apikores) asked Rebbe Avahu the following question: Hashem is a kohen, as it says "veyikcho li terumah." When Hashem buried Moshe Rabbeinu, in what did He immerse himself? Rebbe Avahu answered that He immersed himself in fire. Tosafos there asks why the min did not inquire as to how Hashem was able to become tamei by burying Moshe Rabbeinu. Tosafos answers that this did not bother the min because he knew that we are considered children of Hashem and that a kohen is permitted to bury his children.

According to Tosafos, Hashem would not be able to be metamei by killing someone, since even a kohen may only become tamei by burying his children, not by killing them. The Haggadah states that Hashem himself performed makkas bechoros. How then did Hashem himself kill the bechorim of Mitzrayim?

It is this question that the Maseches Semachos wishes to address when it brings down this medrash. The beginning of Maseches Semachos discusses the halachos regarding when one is dying but is still alive (goseis). Therefore, it began with a medrash that proves to us that during such a state, a person is not considered dead and thus not yet metamei. Since Hashem only delivered the blow that would kill the bechorim, He was not metamei to the bechorim since they were not yet dead.

On a side note, Reb Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, zt"l, is quoted as explaining the discrepancy between the berachah of "ga'al Yisrael" that we say after Shema of Shacharis and the same berachah that we say in Ma'ariv. In Shacharis we say "miMitzrayim g'altanukol bechoreihem haragta." The mention of redeeming us from Mitzrayim precedes the mention of killing the bechorim. In Ma'ariv we say "hamakeh b'evraso kol bechorei Mitzrayim vayotzei es amo Yisrael mitocham lecheirus olam." The mention of hitting the bechorim of Mitzrayim precedes that of our redemption from Mitzrayim. This is because, as Maseches Semachos stated that at chatzos of the night Hashem only delivered the blow that would eventually kill the bechorim, the bechorim did not actually die until the morning. So at night we mention the blow that was delivered to the bechorim before the redemption, which only took place the following morning. In Shacharis, which is recited in the morning, we mention the redemption from Mitzrayim before the death of the bechorim because the redemption preceded the actual death of the bechorim, which occurred during the day.

The Shivus Yaakov (1:17) asks the following question on the Maseches Semachos: Why did the Mishnah not simply answer the contradiction in the pasukim (whether makkas bechoros occurred at night or by day) by saying that if a bechor was born after chatzos, even in the morning, he would die as well? The Shivus Yaakov suggests that based on this question it is imperative that a bechor who was born after chatzos did not die. Based on this observation, he rules that if one has a son born to him on the night before Pesach – after chatzos – he does not have to fast for that bechor since  had he been a Mitzri in Mitzrayim, he would not have been killed. Therefore, his father, who would generally have to fast on Erev Pesach for his bechor who is under bar mitzvah age, does not have to fast for his son.

For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

Thursday, January 10, 2013

Must One Hear His Own Davening?

Dedicated to the refuah sheleimah of Shlomo Eliezer ben Chaya Sarah Elka.

After each of the makkos, Moshe Rabbeinu had to daven to Hashem to stop the makkah. After the makkah of frogs, the pasuk says "…vayitzak Moshe el Hashem al devar hatzefardi'im asher sam l'pharoh – and Moshe cried out to Hashem regarding the frogs that he inflicted on Pharaoh" (Shemos 8:8). This is the only makkah in which we find that the Torah uses the word "vayitzak [cried out]" in reference to how Moshe davened to Hashem. By the other makkos, the Torah uses the word "vayetar." The Sifsei Chachamim asks the question that he says was bothering many people. He asks why the Torah changes its wording by the makkah of the frogs to the word "vayitzak."

The Sifsei Chachamim answers that the frogs were croaking and making a lot of noise. The halacha (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 101:2) states that one who is davening must recite the words loud enough for him to hear what he is saying. Since the frogs were making loud noises, Moshe could not hear his own words. Therefore, he had to scream his tefillah in order to hear his own words.

The Netziv, in his sefer Hemek She'eilah (143:6), points out a contradiction between the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi. The Tosefta (Berachos 3:9) says that one should not say the words loud enough to hear them himself. The Yerushalmi (Berachos 2:4) says that optimally one must recite the words of davening loud enough to hear them himself. The Netziv suggests that there is no dispute between the Tosefta and the Yerushalmi. Rather, the Tosefta agrees that one must say the words loud enough to hear them himself. The Tosefta, however, is referring to a situation of there being a lot of noise and he cannot hear himself – if he speaks at the decibel in which he would hear himself if there was no noise around him. In this situation the Tosefta says that one should not scream louder in order to hear himself over the noise; rather, it is sufficient to say the words at a decibel whereby he would hear himself if it was not noisy.

Regarding davening Krias Shema alone, one is required to say the words louder when he is in a noisy place in order to actually hear the words that he is saying. But tefillah only requires one to say the words at a decibel that, in a quiet atmosphere, he would hear himself; one does not actually have to hear his own words.

The Netziv seemingly contradicts directly what the Sifsei Chachamim said, namely that in a noisy place one must recite the words of davening louder so he can actually hear what he is saying. The Netziv believes that the halacha in which one must hear what he is saying is not to be taken literally; rather, the halacha only requires that one recite the words at a certain decibel that could generally be heard – regardless of whether he can actually hear himself.

Reb Akiva Eiger (Teshuvos 1:30) discusses whether we can apply to different situations the halacha that writing is considered as if one said the words that he wrote (kesivah kedibur), such as Sefiras Ha'omer. If one were to write what the day's omer was, would he have fulfilled his obligation of counting the omer? Reb Akiva Eiger says that regarding mitzvos in which, optimally, one must hear what he is saying, we cannot apply the halacha of kesivah kedibur. This is because even if we consider as if he said the words that he wrote, he nevertheless did not hear them. Therefore we cannot say that he has fulfilled his obligation in an optimal manner.

Some Acharonim suggest that Reb Akiva Eiger's issue that the application of the halacha of kesivah kedibur does not meet the requirements of hearing that which was written is dependent on the abovementioned machlokes. If the requirement to hear what is being said is to be taken literally (that one must actually always hear himself), Reb Akiva Eiger's issue is indeed a valid one. However, if the halacha that one must hear what he is saying does not dictate that one must actually hear himself but rather it is a decibel level of speech that must always be met, perhaps we can also apply kesivah kedibur to situations requiring one to hear himself. This is because the reason for the halacha that one must hear what he is saying is that otherwise, the words are not considered spoken but is instead considered to be thoughts. Once the words are spoken at a decibel in which one could theoretically hear them, they are considered to be spoken words – even if no one actually heard them.

According to the opinion that holds kesivah kedibur, there is another manner in which words can be considered as spoken and not as mere thoughts – namely by writing them. Written words are considered as if they are spoken, even though no one actually heard them. Therefore, even regarding a situation where optimally one is required to hear what he is saying, one could apply the halacha of kesivah kedibur since the written words will now be considered spoken words and not thoughts.

I believe that Reb Akiva Eiger's issue would apply even if he held the opinion that the halacha that one must hear what he is saying is merely a means to render the words as if they were spoken. This is because even the opinion that one does not actually need to hear one's self nonetheless supports the belief that the words have to be spoken on some decibel that could theoretically be heard in a quiet place. Written words, however, can never be heard; thus we could not apply the concept of kesivah kedibur to a situation that requires one to hear himself
.
For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.