In this week’s parsha we learn some of the laws of kashrus. The Torah gives two
characteristics that a land animal must have in order to be kosher: split hooves and brings
up their cud. If a land animal has only one or neither of these characteristics it is not
kosher.

There is a machlokes as to the nature of the requirement of the characteristics of the land
animals. Are the characteristics (split hooves and bringing up its cud) an indication that
the species is kosher (siman), or is the actual possession of the character traits what
renders the animal kosher (seibah) regardless of the species.

The Maharit ( tishuva 51) says that the two characteristics are merely an indication that the species is kosher
and they are not the defining factor of kashrus. He brings a proof from the Mishnah in
Bichoros (5b) that says if a non kosher animal is born from a kosher animal the offspring
is kosher, and if a kosher animal is born from a non kosher one the baby is not kosher.
For example if a cow gives birth to a donkey the donkey is kosher, whereas if a donkey
gives birth to a cow the cow is not kosher. We see from this that an animal can be kosher
even though it lacks the two characteristics of kosher animals, therefore we can infer
that the character traits are not what make the animal kosher rather it is the fact that the
animal belongs to a kosher species.
The Maharit understands the mishnah that we determine an offspring’s species based
on the mother regardless of what the offspring looks like. Therefore if the mother is of
a kosher species, the baby will automatically be considered part of that species even if
it does not have the two characteristics of kosher animals. However there are achronim
who have another understanding of the mishnah as to why an offspring of a kosher
animal is kosher even when it resembles a non kosher species, and why an offspring of
a non kosher species is not kosher even when it resembles a kosher animal. They learn
that there is a new issur that applies to an animal that comes from a non kosher animal
even if the offspring has the characteristics of a kosher animal. Similarly, there is a heter
to eat an animal that comes from a kosher animal even if it does not possess the kosher
characteristics. According to these achronim the offspring does not assume the species
of its mother; rather it determines its own species based on its characteristics. However
even though it belongs to whichever species it most resembles, the mother does affect its
permissibility to be eaten.
According to the Maharit when a donkey gives birth to a cow, the cow is considered a
donkey and therefore not kosher. Whereas according to the second opinion the cow is a
cow however this cow is forbidden because it came from a non kosher animal.

One nafka meina (difference) between these two opinions is whether we can use the
hide of an offspring that is bearing non kosher signs who’s mother was a kosher animal,
for writing on them a sefer torah. If the animal is a non kosher species its hide may
not be used for writing a sefer Torah. If the animal is of a kosher species and is merely
forbidden to eat its hide may be used for writing a Sefer Torah.
The gimorah in Chullin (62 b) says that the male “swamp chicken” is forbidden but the
female “swamp hen” is permitted. Tosafos (d”h tarnigolsa) says the gimorah cannot
mean that the male of one species is non kosher and the female of that species is kosher
because the mishnah says if a kosher animal gives birth to a non kosher animal the
offspring is permited. So there can never be a non kosher male of these species since
they come from a kosher female mother. Therefore Tosafos explains that the gimorah is
referring to two separate species, and one is kosher both male and female, and one is non
kosher both male and female.

Tosafos in Nidah (50b) argues with Toasfos in Chullin and says the Gimorah is referring
to one species and the male is non kosher and the female is kosher. As to Tosafos in
chullin’s question from the mishnah, tosafos in niddah answers that the process in which
this species lays eggs is different from the norm in that the offspring do not directly come
from the mother rather they form on their own. Therefore the male of this species remains
non kosher even though it has a kosher mother.

Reb Ekchonon Wasserman zt”l Hy”d ( kovaitz shiurim chulin ois 27) explains that the
two tosfosim are essentially arguing the dispute mentioned above as to the nature of the
kosher characteristics. Tosafos in niddah is of the opinion that the kosher signs are what
makes an animal kosher and the lack of the signs is by definition a non kosher animal.
Therefore when a kosher animal gives birth to a non kosher animal the offspring should
be non kosher however since the mother was a kosher animal the offspring is permitted.
However that heter is only acquired when the offspring comes directly from the mother.
That is why tosafos says that since the offspring of this species does not come directly
from the mother it does not get that heter.
Tosafos in Chullin disagrees that the kosher signs serve only as an indication to what
species the animal belongs to, and we determine an animal’s specie by its mother.
Therefore this tosafos cannot offer the solution of tosafos in Niddah that the offspring
does not directly come from the mother because regardless we will define the specie
based on the mother and the male offspring will be kosher.
I would argue that perhaps Tosafos in Chullin can agree with Tosafos in Niddah because
the determination of the species should only follow the mother if the offspring comes
directly from the mother.

Zachor

In this week’s parshas Zachor haftarah (Shmuel 1 15:1-3) we read that Shmuel Hanavi, relaying Hashem’s wishes, commanded Shaul Hamelech to destroy everything and everyone among Amalek, including men, women, children, and livestock. Shaul Hamelech killed everyone among Amalek except for King Agag and the best of the livestock. In doing so he had not fulfilled that which was commanded of him; rather he did what was evil in the eyes of Hashem. Shmuel Hanavi then condemned Shaul for disobeying the word of Hashem, and informed him that Hashem has torn the kingship from upon him. Thereafter Shmuel Hanavi had the king of Amalek brought before him, and said, “Just as your sword made women childless, so shall your mother be childless among women.” Shmuel Hanavi then proceeded to execute Agag.

Reb Moshe Shmuel Shapiro, zt”l, quotes the following question from the Brisker Rav: It seems from the statement that Shmuel Hanavi issued prior to executing Agag that he was killing him as a result of him being a murderer. Why did Shmuel Hanavi kill him only because he was a murderer, for was it not enough to kill him because he was an Amaleki – who we are commanded to kill regardless of whether they have murdered?

Reb Moshe Shmuel offers an answer to this question. There is a machlokes whether the mitzvah of zachor (remembering what Amalek did to us) is independent of any other mitzvah. Or is it a prerequisite to the mitzvah of timcheh (annihilate Amalek)? Note: In parshas Beshalach we discussed this question at length.)

The Rambam, in Sefer Hamitzvos (Mitzvos Assei 189), explains that the mitzvah of zachor is in place in order to awaken our souls to wage war against Amalek. Reb Moshe Shmuel suggests that just as the mitzvah of zachor is intended to bring about the mitzvah of timcheh, so too the mitzvah of timcheh should only be carried out through the mitzvah of zachor. With this we can understand that with his statement, Shmuel Hanavi was not inferring that he is killing Agag as a result of him being a murderer, but rather he was fulfilling the mitzvah of zachor by reminding himself of the evil that Agag had done. This enabled him to perform the mitzvah of timcheh.

I want to suggest another answer to the Brisker Rav’s question.
The Rambam says in Hilchos Melachim (1:1-2) that there were three mitzvos that Bnei Yisrael were commanded to do upon entering Eretz Yisrael: 1) appoint a king; 2) destroy Amalek; 3) and build a Beis HaMikdash. The Rambam writes that appointing a king must precede the annihilation of Amalek. Later in Hilchos Melachim (5:1), he writes that a king must first wage milchamos mitzvah (mandatory wars) and then may engage in milchamos rishus (optional wars). Among the milchamos mitzvah is the war against Amalek. There are some who learn from this that in order to perform the mitzvah of mechiyas Amalek (erasing Amalek’s name), there must be a king over Bnei Yisrael.

In the pisukim preceding the execution of Agag, Shmuel Hanavi says several times to Shaul Hamelech that from this day forth Hashem has rejected you as king, and has torn the kingship from you and given it to your fellow who is better than you. At that time Bnei Yisrael were without a king, for Shaul was no longer the king and Dovid was not yet appointed. With this we can understand why Shmuel Hanavi killed Agag only as a consequence for his being a murderer, as the Brisker Rav pointed out, and not because he was an Amaleki. As we said, in order to do the mitzvah of timcheh there must be a king over Bnei Yisrael. Since there was no king at that moment, Shmuel Hanavi could not kill Agag because he was an Amaleki; rather he had to kill him for other reasons.

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Vayikra - L"shmah

Sefer Vayikra, which we start reading this week, primarily discusses halachos of karbanos (sacrifices). The Mishnah in Zivachim 46b discusses the kavanos that one must have while shechting (slaughtering) a karban. The Mishna says that he must have in mind six different kavanos. They are:

1. What type of karban it is, i.e. olah or sh'lamim etc.;

2. Who the karban is for (the owner);

3. The karban is to Hashem;

4. The entire korban will be brought on the fire;

5. The haktarah (smoking) should be exclusively for re’ach (aroma);

6. and that the aroma is a nachas ruach to Hashem.

The Gemara (Zivachim 2b) says that if one shechts a karban and has no specific intention in mind, the karban is kosher because staman lishmah haim (a karban is automatically lishmah).

The Rambam (Pisulai Hamukdashim 13:1) says that only two of the kavanos can render a karban pasul – #1- if one has the wrong karban in mind, and #2- if one has in mind the wrong owner. If one has in mind the wrong kavanah by the other kavanos, the karban is still kosher. In summary, optimally, there are six kavanos that one should have. If he has nothing in mind, it is still kosher. If he has the wrong thing in mind for two of the six, the karban will be pasul, and with the other four the karban will still be kosher.

There is a famous machlokes in understanding the din of stamah lishmah, and how the wrong thoughts disqualify a karban. The Brisker Rav, Reb Yitzchok Zev Soloveitchik, zt”l, in his sefer on the Rambam (Maiseh Hakarbanos 4:11), says that once one sets aside a karban it will automatically always be lishmah, even if the one bringing it has the wrong machshavos. One’s wrong machshavos does not nullify the lishmah set forth by the stamah lishmah; rather it results in a karban that is lishmah, together with wrong machshavos in it as well. A karban with wrong machshavos is pasul, even though it is also lishmah.

This is different than other mitzvos in which the Torah requires lishmah. In other cases the Torah only requires that it be done lishmah. When one has the wrong kavanah, it is not a p’sul; rather the only problem is that it lacks the lishmah. So if we could apply the rule of stamah lishmah, if one has a wrong machshavah it will not be pasul – since you have lishmah, and having the wrong machshavos does not pasul the mitzvah. Only by karbanos did the Torah say that having the wrong machshavos can pasul a karban.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman, zt”l, Hy”d, asks on this p’shat, that Tosafos, in Menachos 42b, seems to disagree. Tosafos says that if one dyes tzitzis for the sake of tzitzis and for the sake of testing the color, the tzitzis is pasul. This is similar, in his view, to that of a karban minchah that was performed lishmah and not lishmah together. We see from Tosafos that having the wrong kavanah by karbanos is comparable to that of other mitzvos. According to the p’shat that the Brisker Rav said in the Rambam, we would not be able to prove for tzitzis that having a wrong kavanah together with the right kavanah is a problem from karbanos. From this Tosafos we see that even by karbanos, having the wrong kavanah is not a positive p’sul. Rather, it makes the karban lack the full, correct kavanah – as is the case by other mitzvos.

Reb Elchonon explains that the purpose of lishmah by karbanos and by mitzvos is that the item or action should be set aside exclusively for the mitzvah. By mitzvos, the kavanah must be had during the action of the mitzvah. By karbanos the kavanah lishmah is fulfilled initially when one sets aside an animal to be a karban. When one has no kavanah in mind during the shechitah, the karban remains set aside for the right purpose; therefore it is still kosher. However, when one has the wrong kavanah he uproots the lishmah that was set forth by setting it aside for a karban; therefore it is pasul.

In conclusion, the machlokes between the Brisker Rav and Reb Elchonon may in fact be a machlokes between the Rambam and Tosafos.

For questions or comments about this column, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

Pikudei - Is It The Thought That Counts?

In this week’s parsha we learn of the erection of the mishkan. The passuk says (הוקם המשכן (40:17 the mishkan was erected, implying that it was erected by itself. Rashi (39: 33) explains that the mishkan was too difficult for any human to erect, therefore Moshe was told to try but in fact it will erect itself. Interestingly, the next passuk says ויקם משה את המשכן , - implying that Moshe actually did erect the mishkan. In order to reconcile these two pissukim, perhaps we can say that although the mishkan erected itself, nonetheless the Torah attributes the mitzvah to Moshe Rabeinu. This is based on the gemarah in Kiddushin (40a) that if one attempts to perform a mitzvah, but, as a result of an אונס he was unable to do so, the Torah considers it as if he had performed the mitzvah. Therefore the Torah attributes the erection of the mishkan to Moshe, who put in all the effort possible, even though he was unable to do it.
There is an interesting machlokes regarding this concept.

The gemarah in Baba Kama (16b) tells us that Yirmiyahu asked Hashem to arrange that when the inhabitants of Anasos (who were seeking to kill him) give tzedakah, their money should go to people who are not worthy of receiving it. This way they would not have the merit of tzedakah.

Reb Elchonon Wasserman zt’l Hy”d (dugmaos libiurai agados 3:5) asks, based on the concept we mentioned, even if Hashem would arrange that the recipients of the tzedaka be unworthy, nonetheless the people giving the tzedaka tried their best and it should be considered as if they performed the mitzvah?!

Reb Elchonon answers that the RamChal in his sefer sefer Derech Hashem writes that when one performs any of the mitzvos besides for fulfilling the commandment and listening to Hashem, he also accomplishes a certain purpose, tikun, and sh’laimus. When one tries to perform a mitzvah and is unavoidably prevented from doing so, he can only receive reward for the first aspect of a mitzvah -fulfilling that which was commanded of him. However that which is accomplished by having performed a mitzvah will not be accomplished when he actually does not fulfill the mitzvah. Yirmiyahu knew that the people of Anasos were resha’im and would certainly not have kavana to do the mitzvah for the sake of the mitzvah in which case they would not receive reward for listening to Hashem’s commandment. However if the money would end up by a poor person they would have accomplished the purpose of the mitzvah and would attain the tikun and shilaimus of that mitzvah. Therefore Yirmiyahu asked that the money should not end up by poor people that way they would not even have accomplished the purpose of the mitzvah.

My rebbi, Reb Shmuel Berenbaum zt”l had a different answer as to what Yirmiyahu would accomplish by asking Hashem to arrange that the recipients of the tzedakah from the people of Anasos be unfit to receive tzedakah. The Gemarah that says “one who tries to perform a mitzvah and is unavoidably prevented is considered as if he performed it” cannot be applied to the case of Yirmiyahu. Because the p’shat in that Gemarah is that we consider the action you were attempting to complete as if it was completed. Therefore the Gemarah only applies in a scenario in which one attempts to do a certain action which if completed would perform a mitzvah and is prevented from completing that action, it is considered as if he completed that specific action that he was trying to do. However we do not apply the rule to one who merely thinks that he wants to do a mitzvah and does an action unrelated to the mitzvah. Therefore if the specific action upon completion would not perform a mitzvah we do not apply the Gemarah, because he was not trying to do a mitzvah he was trying to do this specific action which was not a mitzvah. He does have good kavana and he will be rewarded accordingly, however it is not considered as if he performed the mitzvah. For example if one dons teffilin but is unaware that they are indeed passul, in fact he was trying to don passul teffilin and it will not be considered as if he donned kosher ones.

Now we can understand why Yirmiyahu asked Hashem to arrange that the recipients of the tzedakah not be poor people. Giving money to one who is not a pauper is not an act of a mitzvah. If one tries to do that act he is not trying to do an action of a mitzvah, and we will not apply the gemarah to this case.

For questions and comments about this article e-mail: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com