Sefer Vayikra, which we start reading this week, primarily discusses halachos of karbanos (sacrifices). The Mishnah in Zivachim 46b discusses the kavanos that one must have while shechting (slaughtering) a karban. The Mishna says that he must have in mind six different kavanos. They are:
1. What type of karban it is, i.e. olah or sh'lamim etc.;
2. Who the karban is for (the owner);
3. The karban is to Hashem;
4. The entire korban will be brought on the fire;
5. The haktarah (smoking) should be exclusively for re’ach (aroma);
6. and that the aroma is a nachas ruach to Hashem.
The Gemara (Zivachim 2b) says that if one shechts a karban and has no specific intention in mind, the karban is kosher because staman lishmah haim (a karban is automatically lishmah).
The Rambam (Pisulai Hamukdashim 13:1) says that only two of the kavanos can render a karban pasul – #1- if one has the wrong karban in mind, and #2- if one has in mind the wrong owner. If one has in mind the wrong kavanah by the other kavanos, the karban is still kosher. In summary, optimally, there are six kavanos that one should have. If he has nothing in mind, it is still kosher. If he has the wrong thing in mind for two of the six, the karban will be pasul, and with the other four the karban will still be kosher.
There is a famous machlokes in understanding the din of stamah lishmah, and how the wrong thoughts disqualify a karban. The Brisker Rav, Reb Yitzchok Zev Soloveitchik, zt”l, in his sefer on the Rambam (Maiseh Hakarbanos 4:11), says that once one sets aside a karban it will automatically always be lishmah, even if the one bringing it has the wrong machshavos. One’s wrong machshavos does not nullify the lishmah set forth by the stamah lishmah; rather it results in a karban that is lishmah, together with wrong machshavos in it as well. A karban with wrong machshavos is pasul, even though it is also lishmah.
This is different than other mitzvos in which the Torah requires lishmah. In other cases the Torah only requires that it be done lishmah. When one has the wrong kavanah, it is not a p’sul; rather the only problem is that it lacks the lishmah. So if we could apply the rule of stamah lishmah, if one has a wrong machshavah it will not be pasul – since you have lishmah, and having the wrong machshavos does not pasul the mitzvah. Only by karbanos did the Torah say that having the wrong machshavos can pasul a karban.
Reb Elchonon Wasserman, zt”l, Hy”d, asks on this p’shat, that Tosafos, in Menachos 42b, seems to disagree. Tosafos says that if one dyes tzitzis for the sake of tzitzis and for the sake of testing the color, the tzitzis is pasul. This is similar, in his view, to that of a karban minchah that was performed lishmah and not lishmah together. We see from Tosafos that having the wrong kavanah by karbanos is comparable to that of other mitzvos. According to the p’shat that the Brisker Rav said in the Rambam, we would not be able to prove for tzitzis that having a wrong kavanah together with the right kavanah is a problem from karbanos. From this Tosafos we see that even by karbanos, having the wrong kavanah is not a positive p’sul. Rather, it makes the karban lack the full, correct kavanah – as is the case by other mitzvos.
Reb Elchonon explains that the purpose of lishmah by karbanos and by mitzvos is that the item or action should be set aside exclusively for the mitzvah. By mitzvos, the kavanah must be had during the action of the mitzvah. By karbanos the kavanah lishmah is fulfilled initially when one sets aside an animal to be a karban. When one has no kavanah in mind during the shechitah, the karban remains set aside for the right purpose; therefore it is still kosher. However, when one has the wrong kavanah he uproots the lishmah that was set forth by setting it aside for a karban; therefore it is pasul.
In conclusion, the machlokes between the Brisker Rav and Reb Elchonon may in fact be a machlokes between the Rambam and Tosafos.
For questions or comments about this column, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.
Friday, March 11, 2011
Friday, March 4, 2011
Pikudei - Is It The Thought That Counts?
In this week’s parsha we learn of the erection of the mishkan. The passuk says (הוקם המשכן (40:17 the mishkan was erected, implying that it was erected by itself. Rashi (39: 33) explains that the mishkan was too difficult for any human to erect, therefore Moshe was told to try but in fact it will erect itself. Interestingly, the next passuk says ויקם משה את המשכן , - implying that Moshe actually did erect the mishkan. In order to reconcile these two pissukim, perhaps we can say that although the mishkan erected itself, nonetheless the Torah attributes the mitzvah to Moshe Rabeinu. This is based on the gemarah in Kiddushin (40a) that if one attempts to perform a mitzvah, but, as a result of an אונס he was unable to do so, the Torah considers it as if he had performed the mitzvah. Therefore the Torah attributes the erection of the mishkan to Moshe, who put in all the effort possible, even though he was unable to do it.
There is an interesting machlokes regarding this concept.
The gemarah in Baba Kama (16b) tells us that Yirmiyahu asked Hashem to arrange that when the inhabitants of Anasos (who were seeking to kill him) give tzedakah, their money should go to people who are not worthy of receiving it. This way they would not have the merit of tzedakah.
Reb Elchonon Wasserman zt’l Hy”d (dugmaos libiurai agados 3:5) asks, based on the concept we mentioned, even if Hashem would arrange that the recipients of the tzedaka be unworthy, nonetheless the people giving the tzedaka tried their best and it should be considered as if they performed the mitzvah?!
Reb Elchonon answers that the RamChal in his sefer sefer Derech Hashem writes that when one performs any of the mitzvos besides for fulfilling the commandment and listening to Hashem, he also accomplishes a certain purpose, tikun, and sh’laimus. When one tries to perform a mitzvah and is unavoidably prevented from doing so, he can only receive reward for the first aspect of a mitzvah -fulfilling that which was commanded of him. However that which is accomplished by having performed a mitzvah will not be accomplished when he actually does not fulfill the mitzvah. Yirmiyahu knew that the people of Anasos were resha’im and would certainly not have kavana to do the mitzvah for the sake of the mitzvah in which case they would not receive reward for listening to Hashem’s commandment. However if the money would end up by a poor person they would have accomplished the purpose of the mitzvah and would attain the tikun and shilaimus of that mitzvah. Therefore Yirmiyahu asked that the money should not end up by poor people that way they would not even have accomplished the purpose of the mitzvah.
My rebbi, Reb Shmuel Berenbaum zt”l had a different answer as to what Yirmiyahu would accomplish by asking Hashem to arrange that the recipients of the tzedakah from the people of Anasos be unfit to receive tzedakah. The Gemarah that says “one who tries to perform a mitzvah and is unavoidably prevented is considered as if he performed it” cannot be applied to the case of Yirmiyahu. Because the p’shat in that Gemarah is that we consider the action you were attempting to complete as if it was completed. Therefore the Gemarah only applies in a scenario in which one attempts to do a certain action which if completed would perform a mitzvah and is prevented from completing that action, it is considered as if he completed that specific action that he was trying to do. However we do not apply the rule to one who merely thinks that he wants to do a mitzvah and does an action unrelated to the mitzvah. Therefore if the specific action upon completion would not perform a mitzvah we do not apply the Gemarah, because he was not trying to do a mitzvah he was trying to do this specific action which was not a mitzvah. He does have good kavana and he will be rewarded accordingly, however it is not considered as if he performed the mitzvah. For example if one dons teffilin but is unaware that they are indeed passul, in fact he was trying to don passul teffilin and it will not be considered as if he donned kosher ones.
Now we can understand why Yirmiyahu asked Hashem to arrange that the recipients of the tzedakah not be poor people. Giving money to one who is not a pauper is not an act of a mitzvah. If one tries to do that act he is not trying to do an action of a mitzvah, and we will not apply the gemarah to this case.
For questions and comments about this article e-mail: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
There is an interesting machlokes regarding this concept.
The gemarah in Baba Kama (16b) tells us that Yirmiyahu asked Hashem to arrange that when the inhabitants of Anasos (who were seeking to kill him) give tzedakah, their money should go to people who are not worthy of receiving it. This way they would not have the merit of tzedakah.
Reb Elchonon Wasserman zt’l Hy”d (dugmaos libiurai agados 3:5) asks, based on the concept we mentioned, even if Hashem would arrange that the recipients of the tzedaka be unworthy, nonetheless the people giving the tzedaka tried their best and it should be considered as if they performed the mitzvah?!
Reb Elchonon answers that the RamChal in his sefer sefer Derech Hashem writes that when one performs any of the mitzvos besides for fulfilling the commandment and listening to Hashem, he also accomplishes a certain purpose, tikun, and sh’laimus. When one tries to perform a mitzvah and is unavoidably prevented from doing so, he can only receive reward for the first aspect of a mitzvah -fulfilling that which was commanded of him. However that which is accomplished by having performed a mitzvah will not be accomplished when he actually does not fulfill the mitzvah. Yirmiyahu knew that the people of Anasos were resha’im and would certainly not have kavana to do the mitzvah for the sake of the mitzvah in which case they would not receive reward for listening to Hashem’s commandment. However if the money would end up by a poor person they would have accomplished the purpose of the mitzvah and would attain the tikun and shilaimus of that mitzvah. Therefore Yirmiyahu asked that the money should not end up by poor people that way they would not even have accomplished the purpose of the mitzvah.
My rebbi, Reb Shmuel Berenbaum zt”l had a different answer as to what Yirmiyahu would accomplish by asking Hashem to arrange that the recipients of the tzedakah from the people of Anasos be unfit to receive tzedakah. The Gemarah that says “one who tries to perform a mitzvah and is unavoidably prevented is considered as if he performed it” cannot be applied to the case of Yirmiyahu. Because the p’shat in that Gemarah is that we consider the action you were attempting to complete as if it was completed. Therefore the Gemarah only applies in a scenario in which one attempts to do a certain action which if completed would perform a mitzvah and is prevented from completing that action, it is considered as if he completed that specific action that he was trying to do. However we do not apply the rule to one who merely thinks that he wants to do a mitzvah and does an action unrelated to the mitzvah. Therefore if the specific action upon completion would not perform a mitzvah we do not apply the Gemarah, because he was not trying to do a mitzvah he was trying to do this specific action which was not a mitzvah. He does have good kavana and he will be rewarded accordingly, however it is not considered as if he performed the mitzvah. For example if one dons teffilin but is unaware that they are indeed passul, in fact he was trying to don passul teffilin and it will not be considered as if he donned kosher ones.
Now we can understand why Yirmiyahu asked Hashem to arrange that the recipients of the tzedakah not be poor people. Giving money to one who is not a pauper is not an act of a mitzvah. If one tries to do that act he is not trying to do an action of a mitzvah, and we will not apply the gemarah to this case.
For questions and comments about this article e-mail: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
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