“Moshe brought the people forth from the camp toward Hashem, and they stood under the mountain.” (Yisro 19:17)
The Gemara brings a statement in Maseches Shabbos (88a) that Hashem, during Kabalas HaTorah, held Har Sinai over the Jews and forced acceptance of the Torah. One familiar with the basic storyline is struck with a glaring question: The Jews had already declared their commitment to Hashem with the utterance “Na’aseh v’Nishmah,” (“we will do and we will hear”). Why should Hashem “force” the Jewish people into a situation after the Jewish people had already confirmed their relationship with Hashem and the Torah in no uncertain terms? Further, framing acceptance of the Torah in this context would only seem to take away from the Jews independent kabalah!
No ink has been spared on this question. One answer generally brought by chazal is that of Tosafos, that Hashem was concerned that that the Jews would change their minds out of fear upon experiencing the awesome spectacle at Har Sinai. Another oft cited opinion is found in Medrash Tanchuma (Parshas Noach) that the declaration of Na’aseh v’Nishmah was made only in connection Torah She’Biksav. The Jews, however, at that time, were not willing to accept upon themselves Torah She’Ba’al Peh and had to be coerced. The Medrash concludes that the ameilus necessary to engage in the limud of Torah She’Ba’al Peh can come about only through ahavas Hashem. Notably, the Gemara says that the Jews lovingly 're-accepted' the Torah after the events of Purim.
I would like to propose another approach to answer why the Torah was given with the “mountain over our heads” that is perhaps more relevant to our generation than ever before:
The Rambam enumerates 13 ikkarim - known as 'the 13 ani ma'amins' - that one must fully believe and accept in order to be considered a religious Jew. Rabbi Yaakov Weinberg, in his discussion of the 1st of the ikkarim, explains that one must believe and internalize the absoluteness of Hashem. (article available at http://www.aish.com/sp/ph/48923722.html). The Rambam (explained by Rabbi Weinberg) maintains that the truth of the Torah itself depends upon its being derivative from an absolute source.
Without an objective source for Torah ideals, any ethical system can be judged in terms of modern day thinking. One could not otherwise explain seeming inconsistencies such as why it is one of the “big 3 aveiros” to murder, and yet a Torah commandment to kill Amalek. After all, one may argue, it is unfair to hold Amalek’s descendants accountable for their ancestor’s actions at the time of Yetzias Mitrayim. The absolute objectivity of the Source of our religion explains why we calibrate ourselves to the Torah rather than judge the Torah by modern day standards.
I would like to introduce a thought based on something I once heard from R’ Yitzchak Berkowitz. Throughout history, there were generally accepted societal ideals despite rationalizations that may have been employed to justify contrary modes of conduct; As is often said, one does not have to be a triangle to teach geometry.
By contrast, one does not have to look very far into the headlines of today to see that the average person growing up has no way to distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, appropriate from inappropriate or even what values one should prioritize. (See articles “UN Document Would Give 'Mother Earth' Same Rights as Humans http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/04/13-2 .)
Therefore, the Torah had to be given with the mountain "over our heads" (whether midrashim are meant to be taken literally is beyond the scope of this dvar torah); it had to be muchrach. Indeed, the Jewish people had already committed themselves. However, if our acceptance of the Torah was based solely on our kabalah, the introduction of Torah to the world, and to the Jewish people, would have historically been tied to the acknowledgement of a nation at a given point in time. There would be room for the argument that their acceptance was appropriate for the time, but, after all, times have changed!
Accordingly, the introduction of the Torah into creation had to indicate that Torah is intrinsically ‘absolute'. Not originating or dependant upon the approval of mankind. Rather the Torah is an objective source of truth from Hashem, to be referred to by all people of all origins in any generation, independent of the Jews’ acceptance at that time.
May we be zocheh to once again to adjust ourselves and our mindsets to the priorities and ideals of the Torah and be Mekabel the Torah b'ahavah this Shavuos!
Gut Yom Tov! {M.R.}
To comment on this dvar torah email michaeljrubin@gmail.com or kollelh@gmail.com
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
Friday, June 3, 2011
Naso - Birchas Kohanim - Shome'ah K'oneh
In this week’s parshah the Torah commands the Kohanim to bless Bnei Yisrael (birchas kohanim). The kohanim recite the three p'sukim of blessing, mentioned in the parshah, in front of the congregation. There is an interesting machlokes regarding this mitzvah. The Bais Halevi, in his sefer on Chumash (at the end of Sefer Bereishis), quotes a certain chacham who held that one kohen can recite the pisukim, and the other kohanim who are present can be yotzei (fulfilling of) their obligation of blessing the congregation by means of shomei’a k’oneh (hearing is like answering). Through shome'ah k'oneh it would be considered as if all the kohanim, including those that were silent, recited the p'sukim of blessing to the congregation.
The Bais Halevi disagrees with this opinion, saying that we cannot apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh to the mitzvah of birchas kohanim. He explains that shome'ah k'oneh can only be applied to mitzvos which are fulfilled only through speech. Birchas kohanim requires more than mere speech. The Gemara in Sota 38 derives from the pasuk, “Amor lahem,” that birchas kohanim must be said in a kol rom (loud voice). The Bais Halevi says that although one can be considered to have spoken through shome'ah k'oneh, one cannot attain the kol rom required for birchas kohanim via shome'ah k'oneh.
Many achronim (the Netziv in Maishiv Davar Teshuvah 47, and the Chazon Ish in Orach Chaim 29:2) ask on the p’sak of the Bais Halevi, from various other mitzvos, where there are other requirements besides speech that we apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh. Why then can the requirement of kol rom not be achieved?
Regarding the mitzvah of Kiddush, we find that one is required to recite Kiddush over a cup. As the one listening to the Kiddush does not have a cup, how then can he fulfill his obligation of Kiddush? Similarly, we apply the rule of shomei’a k’oneh to the mitzvos of krias Parshas Zachor and the reading of Megillas Esther, even though both are required to be read from a sefer and not by heart. How then is one who merely hears them without a sefer in his hands able to fulfill his obligation?
Based on these questions, they argue with the Bais Halevi and explain that whenever the rule of shome'ah k'oneh is applied, we focus on the person actually speaking. If he has met all of the requirements necessary for the particular mitzvah, all who hear him are considered as having said what he said – including all of the requirements. For example, by the mitzvah of Kiddush, when one makes Kiddush on a cup all who hear him are considered as if they also made Kiddush on a cup. Therefore, by birchas kohanim, the kohanim who heard the kohen recite the p'sukim of blessing in a loud voice are considered as having recited the p'sukim in a loud voice as well.
The Brisker Rav (the Bais Halevi’s grandson) answered the questions of the achronim on the Bais Halevi with the following explanation: The Bais Halevi agrees that although the one who is hearing Kiddush does not hold a cup and the one hearing the reading of the Torah does not have a sefer, we would be able to apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh. This is because the rule of shome'ah k'oneh can supply the listener with the same spoken words that he heard – namely the Kiddush over a cup or the reading from a sefer.
However, the din that birchas kohanim is required to be said in a loud voice is different than other requirements of other mitzvos. The din that the kohanim must recite birchas kohanim b’kol rom applies in order to enable the congregation to hear them. Even if we were to apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh to the mitzvah of birchas kohanim, and thereby consider the silent kohanim to have had recited the actual p'sukim themselves, the congregation would not be able to hear the voice of those silent kohanim. By applying shome'ah k'oneh, we are only able to consider it as if one had spoken himself; however it cannot supply him with an audible voice that can actually be heard. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh to birchas kohanim, since they are not only required to do the recitation but also required to ensure that they are heard. Whereas by Kiddush and by reading from the Torah or Megillah, shome'ah k'oneh can supply the listener with the recitation as it was done by the reader.
{R.F.}
For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.
The Bais Halevi disagrees with this opinion, saying that we cannot apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh to the mitzvah of birchas kohanim. He explains that shome'ah k'oneh can only be applied to mitzvos which are fulfilled only through speech. Birchas kohanim requires more than mere speech. The Gemara in Sota 38 derives from the pasuk, “Amor lahem,” that birchas kohanim must be said in a kol rom (loud voice). The Bais Halevi says that although one can be considered to have spoken through shome'ah k'oneh, one cannot attain the kol rom required for birchas kohanim via shome'ah k'oneh.
Many achronim (the Netziv in Maishiv Davar Teshuvah 47, and the Chazon Ish in Orach Chaim 29:2) ask on the p’sak of the Bais Halevi, from various other mitzvos, where there are other requirements besides speech that we apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh. Why then can the requirement of kol rom not be achieved?
Regarding the mitzvah of Kiddush, we find that one is required to recite Kiddush over a cup. As the one listening to the Kiddush does not have a cup, how then can he fulfill his obligation of Kiddush? Similarly, we apply the rule of shomei’a k’oneh to the mitzvos of krias Parshas Zachor and the reading of Megillas Esther, even though both are required to be read from a sefer and not by heart. How then is one who merely hears them without a sefer in his hands able to fulfill his obligation?
Based on these questions, they argue with the Bais Halevi and explain that whenever the rule of shome'ah k'oneh is applied, we focus on the person actually speaking. If he has met all of the requirements necessary for the particular mitzvah, all who hear him are considered as having said what he said – including all of the requirements. For example, by the mitzvah of Kiddush, when one makes Kiddush on a cup all who hear him are considered as if they also made Kiddush on a cup. Therefore, by birchas kohanim, the kohanim who heard the kohen recite the p'sukim of blessing in a loud voice are considered as having recited the p'sukim in a loud voice as well.
The Brisker Rav (the Bais Halevi’s grandson) answered the questions of the achronim on the Bais Halevi with the following explanation: The Bais Halevi agrees that although the one who is hearing Kiddush does not hold a cup and the one hearing the reading of the Torah does not have a sefer, we would be able to apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh. This is because the rule of shome'ah k'oneh can supply the listener with the same spoken words that he heard – namely the Kiddush over a cup or the reading from a sefer.
However, the din that birchas kohanim is required to be said in a loud voice is different than other requirements of other mitzvos. The din that the kohanim must recite birchas kohanim b’kol rom applies in order to enable the congregation to hear them. Even if we were to apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh to the mitzvah of birchas kohanim, and thereby consider the silent kohanim to have had recited the actual p'sukim themselves, the congregation would not be able to hear the voice of those silent kohanim. By applying shome'ah k'oneh, we are only able to consider it as if one had spoken himself; however it cannot supply him with an audible voice that can actually be heard. Therefore we cannot apply the rule of shome'ah k'oneh to birchas kohanim, since they are not only required to do the recitation but also required to ensure that they are heard. Whereas by Kiddush and by reading from the Torah or Megillah, shome'ah k'oneh can supply the listener with the recitation as it was done by the reader.
{R.F.}
For questions or comments, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.
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