In this week’s parsha we learn the mitzvah of yishuv eretz yisroel. The passuk says vihorashtem es haaretz viyishavtem bah - you shall possess the Land and settle in it (33:53). The Ramban in his commentary on chumash explains that here the Torah is commanding us in a mitzvas assay to inherit and dwell in Eretz Yisroel. Similarly the Ramban counts this mitzvah in his count of mitzvos assay (number 4 of the mitzvos that the Rambam did not count).
There is an interesting discussion about the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel regarding where and when it can apply.
There are two unique aspects of Eretz Yisroel. One is that it is intrinsically holy. The second is that there are several mitzvos that only apply in Eretz Yisroel. For example terumah, maaser, and most other mitzvos pertaining to things that grow on the ground. The holiness of Eretz Yisroel exists as result of the promise that Hashem made to the Avos that He would give their children Eretz Yisroel. The mitzvos which are unique to Eretz Yisroel only apply when b’nai yisroel conquer the land. Even if they conquer a land that was not part of the originally ‘Promised’ Land, it will become obligated in the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel such as terumah and maser.
The intrinsic holiness of Eretz Yisroel obligates us in a different manner. The Gemarah at the end of Kesubos (110b) discusses various halachos pertaining to Eretz Yisroel and the benefits of living there. For example, one may not leave Eretz Yisroel except under certain circumstances. Also, a husband or wife that desires to live in Eretz Yisroel can force their spouse to move to Eretz Yisroel. The benefits may apply to one who lives in Eretz Yisroel and even to one who is just buried there. The Gemarah informs us that one who lives in Eretz Yisroel has his avairos forgiven, and the Gemarah further relates how the Amoraim would kiss the stones of Eretz Yisroel, and roll in its dirt.
These halachos and benefits result from the intrinsic holiness of Eretz Yisroel due to the promise made to the Avos.
Since these two aspects of Eretz Yisroel are brought about by different causes, they can be mutually exclusive. There can be a place that has only the holiness of Eretz Yisroel without the mitzvos normally associated with Eretz Yisroel. Similarly there can be a place is that is obligated in the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel while it does not possess the intrinsic holiness of other areas in Eretz Yisroel.
The Gemarah in Gittin 8b discusses the status of a land that a king of Yisroel conquers in an improper maner , for example according to Rashi if the king conquered the land for his own purposes not for the general public. The Mahari Korkus (Rambam hilchos terumos 1:2) explains that the discussion in the Gemarah concerning the status of such land is only with regards to the mitzvos that are applicable in Eretz Yisroel, however if part of the promised land is conquered in an improper manner it nevertheless remains holy. Therefore if a king improperly conquered a part of Eretz Yisroel which was promised to the Avos, it would not be obligated in mitzvos associated with Eretz Yisroel. However it would retain its holiness and the halachos & benefits pertaining to living in Eretz Yisroel would still be applicable.
The Radvaz (Rambam hilchos terumos 1:4) says that any land outside the borders of the original promise, (even if it was conquered properly) will only be considered Eretz Yisroel regarding mitzvos, however it will not receive the holiness of Eretz Yisroel.
It is unclear whether the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel is applicable only when the other mitzvos are applicable, or if it is dependent on the holiness of Eretz Yisroel regardless if it obligated in other mitzvos. The Gemarah in Gittin 8b says that one may transgress the rabanan prohibition of amirah l’akum on shabbos (ordering a goi to do a melacha) and order a goi to write a document for the acquiring a house in Suria because of mitzvas yishuv Eretz Yisroel. This is a clear indication that the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel applies even to land outside of the land promised to the Avos, since Suria was not part of the Promised Land.
The Gemarah in Yevamos 64a says that Avraham Avinu fulfilled the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel. Clearly the b’nai yisroel had not conquered Eretz Yisroel at that time. This indicates that although the land had only the holiness set forth by the promise to the Avos one is obligated in the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel.
We can conclude that the mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisroel seemingly applies both to a land that has only the holiness of Eretz Yisroel, and to a land that only has the obligations of the mitzvos of Eretz Yisroel.
May we all be zocheh... B'Karov. {R.F.}
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Friday, July 29, 2011
Friday, July 15, 2011
Pinchas - Kana'us and Kehunah
This week’s parsha begins with the reward that Pinchas received for killing Zimri. Hashem gave Pinchas a bris of shalom and of kehuna that he and his descendents would be kohanim.
The Gimorah in Zivachim 101b brings a machlokes as to whether Pinchas was a kohen from before this episode or not. According to one opinion although Aharon and his sons had already become kohanim, until this episode Pinchas was not a kohen even though he was a grandson to Aharon Hakohen because kehunah was only given to Aharon and his sons and all future generations from then on; excluding those that were already born. According to the opinion that Pinchas was not a kohen prior to this episode we understand that this is when he did become a kohen. However according to the opinion that he was already a kohen why does the Torah say that he was made a kohen in reward for his act of killing Zimri?
The Moshav Zikainim L’balai HaTosafos offers an answer to this question. They say that although Pinchas was a kohen prior to this act he actually lost his kehunah through this act of killing Zimri. As the Gimorah in Birachos 32b says that a kohen who kills is passul (unfit) to duchen. Therefore when Pinchas killed Zimri he became passul for kehunah, creating the necessity for a new kehunah.
The Moshav Zikainim adds that Reb Yichiel of Paris fundamentally disagreed with this answer. Reb Yichiel said that Pinchas did not lose his kehunah when he killed Zimri since the halacha is that a kanoi (a zealot) can kill someone who does an avaira with a goi in public, the one performing the avaira is considered a gavra kitaila (a dead man). A kohen who kills a gavra kitaila does not lose his kehunah. Since the man is already considered dead it is not considered as if the kohen killed him. (The Moshav Zikainim does not quote how Reb Yichiel answers the original question of why was it necessary to make Pinchas a kohen since he already was a kohen.)
It seems that the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel argue about the nature of the right of the kanoi to kill the one performing the avaira. The Balai Tosafos are of the opinion that when the kanoi kills the one performing the avaira it is considered retzichah (murder) and therefore if he was a kohen he would lose his kehunah. Reb Yichiel is of the opinion that it is not considered retzichah when a kanoi kills the one performing the avaira since he is considered dead already.
Perhaps we can say that the underlying machlokes is whether the one performing the avaira is chaiv misa (has a judgment punishable with death) except that instead of bais din killing him the Torah appointed all kanoim to carry out the judgment, or there is no chiyuv misa on him, rather the Torah allowed kanoim to murder under such circumstances. The Balai Tosafos that say that it is considered murder when a kanoi kills, support the notion that there is no judgment of death against the one performing the avaira, therefore it is considered murder. Reb Yichiel who said that it is not considered murder would support the idea that there is a chiyuv misa against the one performing the avaira, therefore he is considered a gavra kitaila (dead man).
Besides for the difference of whether a kohen will become unfit for the avoda if he kills one doing such an avaira, there is another difference between the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel. The halacha is that if one does something for which he will be deserving misa (the death penalty) and and the same time he also became obligated in a monetary debt, he is exempt from the monetary obligation. This is known as kim lay bidiraba minay. There is a question as to whether or not we can apply this rule to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, as a kanoi can kill him. Reb Akiva Aiger in Kisubos 29a is of the opinion that we do apply kim lay bidiraba minay to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, and he will be exempt from any monetary obligations that occur during the avaira.
Apparently Reb Akiva Aiger agrees with Reb Yichiel that there is a chiyuv misa on such a man. Whereas according to the Balai Tosafos that said that there is no judgment of death against one who does an avaira with a goi in public, rather the Torah granted permission to kanoim to kill them, we would not apply the rule of kim lay bidiraba minai in this case and he would be obligated to pay for any monetary obligations that occur during the performance of the avaira.
{R.F.}
For questions and comments please email rabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
The Gimorah in Zivachim 101b brings a machlokes as to whether Pinchas was a kohen from before this episode or not. According to one opinion although Aharon and his sons had already become kohanim, until this episode Pinchas was not a kohen even though he was a grandson to Aharon Hakohen because kehunah was only given to Aharon and his sons and all future generations from then on; excluding those that were already born. According to the opinion that Pinchas was not a kohen prior to this episode we understand that this is when he did become a kohen. However according to the opinion that he was already a kohen why does the Torah say that he was made a kohen in reward for his act of killing Zimri?
The Moshav Zikainim L’balai HaTosafos offers an answer to this question. They say that although Pinchas was a kohen prior to this act he actually lost his kehunah through this act of killing Zimri. As the Gimorah in Birachos 32b says that a kohen who kills is passul (unfit) to duchen. Therefore when Pinchas killed Zimri he became passul for kehunah, creating the necessity for a new kehunah.
The Moshav Zikainim adds that Reb Yichiel of Paris fundamentally disagreed with this answer. Reb Yichiel said that Pinchas did not lose his kehunah when he killed Zimri since the halacha is that a kanoi (a zealot) can kill someone who does an avaira with a goi in public, the one performing the avaira is considered a gavra kitaila (a dead man). A kohen who kills a gavra kitaila does not lose his kehunah. Since the man is already considered dead it is not considered as if the kohen killed him. (The Moshav Zikainim does not quote how Reb Yichiel answers the original question of why was it necessary to make Pinchas a kohen since he already was a kohen.)
It seems that the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel argue about the nature of the right of the kanoi to kill the one performing the avaira. The Balai Tosafos are of the opinion that when the kanoi kills the one performing the avaira it is considered retzichah (murder) and therefore if he was a kohen he would lose his kehunah. Reb Yichiel is of the opinion that it is not considered retzichah when a kanoi kills the one performing the avaira since he is considered dead already.
Perhaps we can say that the underlying machlokes is whether the one performing the avaira is chaiv misa (has a judgment punishable with death) except that instead of bais din killing him the Torah appointed all kanoim to carry out the judgment, or there is no chiyuv misa on him, rather the Torah allowed kanoim to murder under such circumstances. The Balai Tosafos that say that it is considered murder when a kanoi kills, support the notion that there is no judgment of death against the one performing the avaira, therefore it is considered murder. Reb Yichiel who said that it is not considered murder would support the idea that there is a chiyuv misa against the one performing the avaira, therefore he is considered a gavra kitaila (dead man).
Besides for the difference of whether a kohen will become unfit for the avoda if he kills one doing such an avaira, there is another difference between the Balai Tosafos and Reb Yichiel. The halacha is that if one does something for which he will be deserving misa (the death penalty) and and the same time he also became obligated in a monetary debt, he is exempt from the monetary obligation. This is known as kim lay bidiraba minay. There is a question as to whether or not we can apply this rule to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, as a kanoi can kill him. Reb Akiva Aiger in Kisubos 29a is of the opinion that we do apply kim lay bidiraba minay to the one performing an avaira with a goi in public, and he will be exempt from any monetary obligations that occur during the avaira.
Apparently Reb Akiva Aiger agrees with Reb Yichiel that there is a chiyuv misa on such a man. Whereas according to the Balai Tosafos that said that there is no judgment of death against one who does an avaira with a goi in public, rather the Torah granted permission to kanoim to kill them, we would not apply the rule of kim lay bidiraba minai in this case and he would be obligated to pay for any monetary obligations that occur during the performance of the avaira.
{R.F.}
For questions and comments please email rabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
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