Monday, March 19, 2012

Parshas Parah and Shame




The Mechaber in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 685.7) brings the opinion of those that say reading Parshas Parah is required by Torah law. This is challenged from a number of different angles and most Poskim agree that it is a Rabbinic law and not D'oraisah.

One of the possible sources for this being mid'oraisah, is the passuk in parshas eikev (9:7)   זכור אל תשכח את אשר  הקצפת את ה' א' במדבר - Remember, don't forget that you have angered Hashem in the desert. This passuk actually requires us to remember the transgression of the עגל - the golden calf, and since the parah adumah serves as a kapparah for the עגל, we read parshas parah.

Right.

We couldn't find a better portion to read in order to conjure up the memory of the cheit ha'eigel? The story itself is described in vivid detail, both in parshas ki sisah, and also in parshas eikev, following the commandment to remember it!

The often quoted medrash that informs us of the relationship between parah and the eigel tells a mashal of a King whose maid servant's son dirtied the King's palace. The mother of the boy was to come and clean up the mess that he had made. So too the "mother" (being an adult female cow) of the golden calf should come and serve as its atonement.

The reference the medrash makes to the sin of the eigel as being a dirty mess, is quite a rare analogy for sin. Another point to note, is the absence of the boy himself, in his atonement for sin! Wouldn't it be more appropriate for the boy to show up and clean the palace? We should offer a young calf, similar to the eigel, as the kapparah for our sin!

I believe we can answer all of the above with a gemarah in Brachos (12b). Rabbah bar Chinina sabba said in the name of Rav, "One who sins and is ashamed of it, is atoned for all of his sin(s)". The extant of shame needed is clarified in the source the statement. Shaul Hamelech, told the risen soul of Shmuel, that he was not getting direction from G-D through the prophets, nor from visionary dreams. He did not mention the lack of guidance from the Urim V'tumim because he was ashamed to mention the Kohein's garment since he had killed out Nov - a city of Kohanim. This shame granted Shaul atonement for his sins.

The mashal given by the medrash is a perfect analogy not only to the sin that took place, but more accurately to the disgrace of what took place! How brazen would the boy have to be, to come back to the palace and face the mess he made! The fact that his mother is needed to come and clean, instead of himself, is a healthy sign of the boy's tremendous feeling of shameful guilt.

Perhaps this is  the reason why the commandment requiring us to remember the eigel is pretty vague about what to remember. Though we are commanded to remember 'that we angered Hashem in the desert', by no means are we required to explicitly speak out the horrific details in public! On the contrary, our shame to mention it in such a manner, is in itself an atonement for the sin!

This crystallizes the gemarah in megillah (25b) which presents the possibility of never publicly reading and translating the story of the eigel, even in the course of the general krias haTorah, due to the disgrace we would feel upon its reading. The gemarah responds that we'd prefer its reading, since the shame adds to our atonement. We may say this is true when the story is read as a manner of course and part of the regular reading , so it does not stand out as openly. However the notion to read the story as its own kriah, is not only preposterous, but also wrong and inappropriate. On the contrary, our shame to read so openly about it, and instead read the parshas parah adumah, which just hints to it, is a positive trait and offers us the true atonement we look forward to.


P.S. It is certainly clear from the gemarah in megillah mentioned above, that krias haTorah should be an involving experience, evoking emotions and feelings. Let's hope.









Thursday, March 15, 2012

vaykel

May Beis Din Punish On Shabbos?

The Yerushalmi, in Sanhedrin 4:6, derives from the pasuk in the beginning of this week's parshah, "lo seva'aru eish b'chol moshvoseichem b'yom HaShabbos - and you shall not ignite a fire in any of your dwellings on Shabbos," that Beis Din is prohibited from judging on Shabbos. The Rambam, in Hilchos Shabbos 24:7, rules that Beis Din may not carry out the punishment of either death or lashes on Shabbos. He cites the same pasuk of "lo seva'aru" as the source for this halacha. In his Sefer Hamitzvos the Rambam lists as a separate negative commandment (number 322) that Beis Din may not judge or carry out a punishment on Shabbos.

The simple understanding of this halacha is that even though it is a mitzvah to kill someone who is chayav misah (deserving death) on Shabbos, it is forbidden. Despite being a mitzvah it may not be performed on Shabbos, when killing is prohibited, since the Torah says that the Shabbos should not be desecrated for this purpose. However, the Minchas Chinuch asks why the Rambam lists this as a separate mitzvah, when in fact it is the regular prohibition of not killing on Shabbos. This implies that the prohibition to judge and carry out punishments is a new prohibition, separate from the prohibition to kill on Shabbos.

The Magen Avraham, in Orach Chaim 339:3, discusses this matter and proves that there is a new prohibition to judge and exact punishment on Shabbos. He cites the abovementioned Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos and points out that the Rambam includes in the prohibition that Beis Din may not administer lashes on Shabbos. The Magen Avraham says that there is no prohibition of giving someone lashes on Shabbos, but rather that this is forbidden because there is a new prohibition not to judge and punish on Shabbos. He concludes that this is not a clear proof since often, when Beis Din administers lashes bloody wounds are created – which is forbidden on Shabbos.

The Rashba, in Teshuvos 1:357, holds that Beis din may appoint a non-Jew to carry out their verdicts. This is because the one who carries out the punishment does not have to be a real shaliach of Beis Din; rather it merely must be done on their behalf. Reb Elchanon Wasserman, zt"l, Hy"d, in Kovetz Haurus 76:18, explains that Beis Din does not have to carry out the actual punishment; instead they must arrange for it to be executed, and therefore they may appoint someone who is not generally suitable for shalichus. Alternatively the Rashba can be explained, based on the ruling of the Nesivos Hamishpat (Choshen Mishpat 182:1) that says that a non-Jew is fit for shalichus when all that is required is an action. A non-Jew is only unfit for shalichus of a transaction. Therefore Beis Din may appoint a non-Jew to execute their punishments.

Several Achronim ask the following question concerning the ruling of the Rashba: The Gemara, in Yevamos 6b, implies that there is never a situation whereby Beis Din may execute the death penalty on Shabbos. Since Beis Din may appoint a non-Jew to carry out their punishments, why then can they not punish on Shabbos by appointing a non-Jew to kill? However, if we say that there is a separate prohibition to judge and punish on Shabbos, aside from the actual killing, then Beis Din would be prohibited to do so – even if they were to appoint a non-Jew to carry out their verdict.

The Mishnah in Sanhedrin 73a says that if one is chasing after another in an attempt to kill him, everyone must prevent the attempted murder by any means – even by taking the life of the attempted murderer. The Mishnah says that this halacha also applies when one is chasing after one of the arayos. If one is chasing another man on Shabbos, there is no doubt that the halacha applies and that he may be killed since it is a matter of pikuach nefesh. However the Mishneh L'melech says that he is unsure whether the halacha applies to one who is chasing after one of the arayos, since it is not a matter of pikuach nefesh. The reason that he says that perhaps one would not be allowed to kill someone who is chasing one of the arayos is because it is a punishment that cannot be administered on Shabbos.

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