talmidei r' akiva sefiras omer

In Yevamos 52b we learn about the tragic story of talmidei R' Akiva that was
due to the fact that 'lo nahagu kavod zeh lazeh? - They did not act
with honor one to another.

The Maharsha says that they verbally degraded each other & therefore
their punishment was a fatal condition associated with the mouth.
While this explains what they did wrong & the midah k'neged midah,
however the lashon of the gemara - shelo nahagu kavod - does not seem
to be a positive act of degradation, rather what they did NOT do -
shev v'al tasseh.

The untimely death of twenty four thousand torah students because of
what seems to be just a deficiency in some midas chassidus is quite
perplexing and requires study.

The gemara (kiddushin 39b) relates the story of the unnatural death of
a son who went up a tree to do shiluach hakein & bring a bird for his
father. The gemara provides a possibilty for his mid-mitzvah tragedy
because he may have sinned with thoughts of avodah zarah while doing
the mitzvah.
The Dibros Moshe states that the gemarah could not attribute his
unnatural death to improper thoughts of women, for although the
prohibition against it is d'oraisah, it still would not result in such
a death.

Similarly, from the fact the talmidei R? Akiva died the bitter &
unnatural death of ask'ra, it seems not to have been due to a lack of
midas chassidus. (One may argue on the comparison from a typical boy
to an expected level of chassidus of talmidei R? Akiva.)

The Maharsha (& others with different nuances - mishnas R? Aharon,
michtav meEliyah, maharal) learn this as a problem
in the kavod haTorah of each other. However the general 'velt? seems
to learn as the Iyun Yakov notes, that this is a story of lack of
simple bein adam l'chaveiro. Yet from the severity of punishment it
appears as a real transgression of
some issur min hadin. If this is so, it requires understanding as from
where do we find a real chiyuv of kavod to another equal Jew (not
because of his Torah) who is not a parent, Rebbi, or elder?

The gemara shabbos 31a relates the incident with the ger who ask to
learn all of Torah on one foot. Regarding the well-known response of
Hillel "mai d'alach sani l'chavrach lo savid? the maharsha points out
that this was said in the negative rather than positive form - love
your friend as yourself, because truthfully, in the positive, it's not
required to love another as much as one's self rather 'chayecha
kodmim'.
Similarly, the Ramban on the passuk ve'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
(kedoshim 19.18) says that one is not required, NOR CAPABLE, of loving
another equally with himself. However the Ramban states that although
we can't love another as much as ourselves, we are commanded against
specifically wanting another to have LESS than ourselves. What's
amazing from this Ramban is even though if you're not doing or wishing
you friend any HARM - just less massive wealth, wisdom, or blessing
than yourself, it is already transgressing this mitzvah.
The maharsha may still hold that one is able to love that much, but
definitely not commanded to do so actively. This leaves room perhaps
for the literal positive form of the passuk to be a chiyuv in the
heart and 'chayecha kodmin in ma'aseh.

On a side note, it appears from the gemara yevamos 61a that with
regards to one's wife we are capable of completely equal ahava (and
perhaps then required so as well) which goes in tandem with the fact
of ishto k'gufo ? she IS like yourself. R? Avraham Gurwitz in Toras
Avraham on Rambam Yesodi HaTorah & De'os suggests that regarding one's
wife there might not be a din of chayecha kodmin at all, as she must
be treated totally kamocha. It is interesting that one is also
encouraged to honor his wife more than himself. This may be due to the
fact that since ishto k'gufo, unless one shows a distinction between
his own honor and that of his wive's, it would be rendered self love
and he has not fulfilled the requirement of v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
in her. Certainly this distinction cannot be in the form of less
honor as that would transgress the general chiyuv of kamocha as
metioned by the Ramban above.

Please note the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos assay 206 & in hilchos de'os
6.3 seems to hold that one is capable & required
to have complete equal love for another without any limitations. The
Rambam would have to say that chayecha kodmin only applies to acts &
deeds, but the actual love & good will towards another must be equal
to oneself.

Based on the Ramban and above Maharsha (and many other classic
rishonim and achronim), we may conclude as follows. The equal love of
'kamocha? required by the Torah, is not to allow oneself priority over
his friend by treating or even FEELING towards the other any more
NEGATIVELY than toward yourself.

The question remains what kavod was demanded of talmidei R? Akiva min
hadin, that is associated with the mouth and yet that was not
fulfilled b'shev v'al ta'aseh?

Kavod takes on many forms and has various expressions. Standing up for
Talmidei Chachomim, preparing food, clothing, and escorting parents in
or out. Dressing and eating differently than normal is kavod chol
hamoed as brought by R? Yonah in Avos.

R? Shlomo Wolbe in alei shur offers an enlightening definition of the
word Kavod. It may well be 'substantial'. Kaved means
heavy, meaning containing more mass/substance. (Accordingly, kaved
rosh as opposed
to kalus rosh is a mind that is either heavy with substancial thought
or light without
substancial thought.)

There is another thing which I found to be interesting as an example
for kavod, but based on this definition it sheds a great light upon
this sugyah. The mesilas Yeshorim in perek 22 describes deeds of
anavah - humbleness. One of the manners of a humble person, is to
honor others. The prime example of this is "hevei makdim shalom l'chol
adam". At first glance this does not appear to be an act of kavod,
rather a polite manner that enhances human relationships. However, in
truth this may be Kavod in its purest & simplest form. Acting in a way
that REGARDS the SUBSTANTIAL EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER. Although this may
not fit with the classic english definition of the word kavod, however
the Ramchal clearly defines this simple act as kavod.

To understand this a bit deeper, the Maharal regarding the sugyah of
ona'as devarim (baba metziah 58b) explains that the mishnah's first
case of ona'ah is the defining example for what ona'as devarim is.
This is the case of one who asks a merchant for the price of an item
without any intention to buy it. It seems that this is ona'ah even
when the merchant doesn't realize his time time is being wasted. The
Maharal explains that this defines ona'ah, as taking advantage of
another to the point where the victim is degraded - even if just in
the eyes of the offender - to be just an object of entertainment as
opposed to a human of intrinsic value.

Perhaps we can add along these lines, that noticing another Jew and
acting as if he didn't exist, or is less "substantially existent" than
yourself, by ignoring his presence is a direct transgression of
v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha, as explained by the Ramban. This is the
minimal form of kavod due to any individual - that his existence as a
human with feelings be recognized. Hevai makdim Shalom l'chol adam may
very well be the halachically required, d'oraisah chiyuv, of kavod
that we are all commanded to do for another Jew regardless of his his
age or wisdom. This can be the shev v'al taasaeh lack of kavod that
was required of the talmidei R? Akiva min hadin. This is also a
universal form of kavod performed with the mouth, and hence the
punishment of assk"ra.


Let us all be TALMIDEI CHACHOMIM MARBIM SHALOM BA'OLAM.
----- Original Message -----

From: "dov milstein" <dovmil@gmail.com>
To: dovmil@gmail.com
Cc: ymilstein@gmail.com, rabbirfuchs@gmail.com
Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2013 2:12:26 AM
Subject: Re: kavod edit 2



In Yevamos 52b we learn about the tragic story of talmidei R? Akiva that was
due to the fact that 'lo nahagu kavod zeh lazeh? - They did not act
with honor one to another.

The Maharsha says that they verbally degraded each other & therefore
their punishment was a fatal condition associated with the mouth.
While this explains what they did wrong & the midah k'neged midah,
however the lashon of the gemara - shelo nahagu kavod - does not seem
to be a positive act of degradation, rather what they did NOT do -
shev v'al tasseh.

The untimely death of twenty four thousand torah students because of
what seems to be just a deficiency in some midas chassidus is quite
perplexing and requires study.

The gemara (kiddushin 39b) relates the story of the unnatural death of
a son who went up a tree to do shiluach hakein & bring a bird for his
father. The gemara provides a possibilty for his mid-mitzvah tragedy
because he may have sinned with thoughts of avodah zarah while doing
the mitzvah.
The Dibros Moshe states that the gemarah could not attribute his
unnatural death to improper thoughts of women, for although the
prohibition against it is d'oraisah, it still would not result in such
a death.

Similarly, from the fact the talmidei R? Akiva died the bitter &
unnatural death of ask'ra, it seems not to have been due to a lack of
midas chassidus. (One may argue on the comparison from a typical boy
to an expected level of chassidus of talmidei R? Akiva.)

The Maharsha (& others with different nuances - mishnas R? Aharon,
michtav meEliyah, maharal) learn this as a problem
in the kavod haTorah of each other. However the general 'velt? seems
to learn as the Iyun Yakov notes, that this is a story of lack of
simple bein adam l'chaveiro. Yet from the severity of punishment it
appears as a real transgression of
some issur min hadin. If this is so, it requires understanding as from
where do we find a real chiyuv of kavod to another equal Jew (not
because of his Torah) who is not a parent, Rebbi, or elder?

The gemara shabbos 31a relates the incident with the ger who ask to
learn all of Torah on one foot. Regarding the well-known response of
Hillel "mai d'alach sani l'chavrach lo savid? the maharsha points out
that this was said in the negative rather than positive form - love
your friend as yourself, because truthfully, in the positive, it's not
required to love another as much as one's self rather 'chayecha
kodmim'.
Similarly, the Ramban on the passuk ve'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
(kedoshim 19.18) says that one is not required, NOR CAPABLE, of loving
another equally with himself. However the Ramban states that although
we can't love another as much as ourselves, we are commanded against
specifically wanting another to have LESS than ourselves. What's
amazing from this Ramban is even though if you're not doing or wishing
you friend any HARM - just less massive wealth, wisdom, or blessing
than yourself, it is already transgressing this mitzvah.
The maharsha may still hold that one is able to love that much, but
definitely not commanded to do so actively. This leaves room perhaps
for the literal positive form of the passuk to be a chiyuv in the
heart and 'chayecha kodmin in ma'aseh.

On a side note, it appears from the gemara yevamos 61a that with
regards to one's wife we are capable of completely equal ahava (and
perhaps then required so as well) which goes in tandem with the fact
of ishto k'gufo ? she IS like yourself. R? Avraham Gurwitz in Toras
Avraham on Rambam Yesodi HaTorah & De'os suggests that regarding one's
wife there might not be a din of chayecha kodmin at all, as she must
be treated totally kamocha. It is interesting that one is also
encouraged to honor his wife more than himself. This may be due to the
fact that since ishto k'gufo, unless one shows a distinction between
his own honor and that of his wive's, it would be rendered self love
and he has not fulfilled the requirement of v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha
in her. Certainly this distinction cannot be in the form of less
honor as that would transgress the general chiyuv of kamocha as
metioned by the Ramban above.

Please note the Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos assay 206 & in hilchos de'os
6.3 seems to hold that one is capable & required
to have complete equal love for another without any limitations. The
Rambam would have to say that chayecha kodmin only applies to acts &
deeds, but the actual love & good will towards another must be equal
to oneself.

Based on the Ramban and above Maharsha (and many other classic
rishonim and achronim), we may conclude as follows. The equal love of
'kamocha? required by the Torah, is not to allow oneself priority over
his friend by treating or even FEELING towards the other any more
NEGATIVELY than toward yourself.

The question remains what kavod was demanded of talmidei R? Akiva min
hadin, that is associated with the mouth and yet that was not
fulfilled b'shev v'al ta'aseh?

Kavod takes on many forms and has various expressions. Standing up for
Talmidei Chachomim, preparing food, clothing, and escorting parents in
or out. Dressing and eating differently than normal is kavod chol
hamoed as brought by R? Yonah in Avos.

R? Shlomo Wolbe in alei shur offers an enlightening definition of the
word Kavod. It may well be 'substantial'. Kaved means
heavy, meaning containing more mass/substance. (Accordingly, kaved
rosh as opposed
to kalus rosh is a mind that is either heavy with substancial thought
or light without
substancial thought.)

There is another thing which I found to be interesting as an example
for kavod, but based on this definition it sheds a great light upon
this sugyah. The mesilas Yeshorim in perek 22 describes deeds of
anavah - humbleness. One of the manners of a humble person, is to
honor others. The prime example of this is "hevei makdim shalom l'chol
adam". At first glance this does not appear to be an act of kavod,
rather a polite manner that enhances human relationships. However, in
truth this may be Kavod in its purest & simplest form. Acting in a way
that REGARDS the SUBSTANTIAL EXISTENCE OF THE OTHER. Although this may
not fit with the classic english definition of the word kavod, however
the Ramchal clearly defines this simple act as kavod.

To understand this a bit deeper, the Maharal regarding the sugyah of
ona'as devarim (baba metziah 58b) explains that the mishnah's first
case of ona'ah is the defining example for what ona'as devarim is.
This is the case of one who asks a merchant for the price of an item
without any intention to buy it. It seems that this is ona'ah even
when the merchant doesn't realize his time time is being wasted. The
Maharal explains that this defines ona'ah, as taking advantage of
another to the point where the victim is degraded - even if just in
the eyes of the offender - to be just an object of entertainment as
opposed to a human of intrinsic value.

Perhaps we can add along these lines, that noticing another Jew and
acting as if he didn't exist, or is less "substantially existent" than
yourself, by ignoring his presence is a direct transgression of
v'ahavta l'reyacha kamocha, as explained by the Ramban. This is the
minimal form of kavod due to any individual - that his existence as a
human with feelings be recognized. Hevai makdim Shalom l'chol adam may
very well be the halachically required, d'oraisah chiyuv, of kavod
that we are all commanded to do for another Jew regardless of his his
age or wisdom. This can be the shev v'al taasaeh lack of kavod that
was required of the talmidei R? Akiva min hadin. This is also a
universal form of kavod performed with the mouth, and hence the
punishment of assk"ra.


Let us all be TALMIDEI CHACHOMIM MARBIM SHALOM BA'OLAM.

The Mitzvah of Destroying Chametz

There is a mitzvah to remove and destroy the chametz from one's possession before Pesach. This is derived from the pasuk in parshas Bo that says …tashbisu s'or mibatechem (Shemos 12:15). There are also two lavim associated with owning chametz on Pesach; bal yiraeh and bal yimatzeh.

The Minchas Chinuch discusses the following question regarding the mitzvah of tashbisu (to remove and destroy the chametz from one's possession): is the mitzvah accomplished only by actively owning chametz and destroying it, or can one fulfill the mitzvah by not owning any chametz to begin with? In other words, does one have to actively destroy the chametz or may one fulfill the mitzvah by not ever owning chametz and not lifting a finger (shev vial taaseh) to destroy it.

We find that there are mitzvos that one can fulfill without actively performing an action. On Shabbos there is a mitzvah of shabason which is a mitzvas assay that one must rest and by definition not perform any melachos. If one performs a melacha on Shabbos, aside from the lo sassay, he has transgressed the assay of shaboson. If one does not perform any melachos on Shabbos, he has fulfilled the assay of shabason. Perhaps the assay of tashbisu is the same and if one did not own any chametz before Pesach he will have fulfilled the mitzvah of tashbisu.

The other option is that the mitzvah of tashbisu is similar to that of tzitzis where if one does not have a four cornered garment with tzitzis on it he has not fulfilled the mitzvah. if one does not own a four cornered garment with tzitzis he has not transgressed the mitzvah of tzitzis however he also has not fulfilled it.

There are several differences between these two options. If there is a requirement to actively destroy the chametz before Pesach then obviously one only fulfills the mitzvah if he has chametz finds it and destroys it. this is why we place bread out before bidekas chametz, to ensure that we will have bread to destroy the next day. If there is no need to actively destroy the chametz and one can fulfill the mitzvah if he simply does not own chametz then one would not have to ensure that he has chametz to burn the next day.

Another difference is if another person grabs one's chametz and destroys it before the owner had a chance to do so. Generally, when one steals a mitzvah from another person he must pay him ten zehuvim. If the mitzvah is to actively destroy the chametz then the person who grabbed and burned the chametz would be required to pay the owner ten zehuvim. If the mitzvah is fulfilled by merely not owning chametz without actively destroying it then the person would not have to pay the owner ten zehuvim since the owner fulfilled the mitzvah the same as if he had burned it himself.

The Minchas Chinuch mentions another difference between these two options is in a scenario where one has chametz on Pesach. The mitzvah applies even on Pesach and one must destroy his chametz on Pesach as well. There is a machlokes how one must fulfill the mitzvah of tashbisu if one does have chametz. The Rabanan say that it can be performed by any means of destruction, even eating. Rabbi Yehuda says that it must be done by burning the chametz. According to the Rabbanan, if one ate his chametz on Pesach it would be a means of destruction. However if the mitzvah is only fulfilled by actively destroying the chametz this action will be considered a mitzvah habah biavera, since eating chametz on Pesach is forbidden. According to the Minchas Chinuch when one performs a mitzvah habah biavera he has not fulfilled the mitzvah. However if the mitzvah if fulfilled by simply not owning chametz then eating it on Pesach would not constitute a mitzvah habah biavera and one will have fulfilled the mitzvah of tashbisu.

The Minchas Chinuch says that it is indicative from the Chinuch that he is of the opinion that the mitzvah is fulfilled simply by not owning chametz. This is because the Chinuch says that someone who is traveling before Pesach is obligated in the mitzvah of tashbisu. The Minchas Chinuch says that if the mitzvah required an active destruction then one who would be traveling before Pesach would not be obligated in it.

Another indication that the Chinuch is of the opinion that the mitzvah of tashbisu does not require active destruction is from the fact that he says that women are obligated in the mitzvah. if the mitzvah required an active destruction then women would be exempt since it is a mitzvas assay shehazman grama (time sensitive mitzvah). However if it is not an active requirement then women would be obligated even though it is a mitzvas assay shehazman grama.

One final difference is whether one is required to have kavanah will destroying his chametz. If the mitzvah requires an active destruction then one would be required to have kavana when destroying it. if the mitzvah is fulfilled by simply not owning chametz one would not need kavanah when destroying his chamtetz.

for questions or comments email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com

Additionally, Rabbi Fuchs has just come out with an english Torah magazine called " The Kuntris". It is available in your local grocery and other fine retailers. The introductory price is only 1 dollar.