The Gemarah in Shabbos (97b) learns from the passuk in this week’s parsha, (35:1) אלה הדברים , that there are thirty nine milachos that one must refrain from doing on shabbos. Rashi on the Gemarah explains that the gimatriyah of the word אלה is thirty six, plus the word 'devarim' is plural, and therefore implies two, and the ה of HAdivarim includes one more, that is three, and the , totaling thirty nine.
There is another Gemarah in Shabbos (49b) which brings an alternate source for the thirty nine milachos,
from the fact that the torah juxtaposed the parsha of shabbos to that of the building of the mishkan. We are to infer from this that those constructive acts used in the building of the mishkan are the milachos that are prohibited on shabbos.
If one transgresses one of the thirty nine milachos, the product of that milacha is forbidden to use. This is known as maiseh shabbos. There is a machlokes amongst the Tanaim whether this is forbidden by the Torah or mid'Rabanan. We paskin that it is forbidden mid'Rabanan. For example cooking is one of the thirty nine milachos, if one cooks on shabbos the food is forbidden to eat.
It is unclear as to the nature of the prohibition of the product of maiseh shabbos. Reb Chaim Soloveitchik (stencils 378) says that the prohibition of maiseh shabbos is different than other prohibitions, such as bassar b'chalav (cooked meat and milk).
With regard to the prohibition of bassar b'chalav, the Torah said that this item is forbidden (issur cheftzah). Meaning to say that by Torah law the item has a deficiency being that it is bassar b'chalav. However the prohibition of maiseh shabbos is a restriction on the person (issur gavrah) so as not to benefit from the milocha. The actual item is not intrinsically prohibited.
Another example of this type of prohibition is the prohibition not to eat on Yom Kippor where the actual food is not prohibited, rather the person is restricted from eating it.
Reb Moshe Feinstein (Igros Moshe O.C.1 126:3) argues and says that the product of maiseh shabbos is intrinsically forbidden, and similar to that of bassar b'chalav.
One difference that exists between these two opinions is, whether the pot that you cooked in will become forbidden as a result of the prohibited food giving off flavor into it. The flavor of that food remains in the walls of the pot, and is then expelled into the new food during its next use. This can render the new food forbidden as well. However this will only apply to a food item that is forbidden, for if the food is intrinsically permitted and only the person is restricted from it, it will therefore be permitted.
Therefore according to Reb Chaim, who holds that maiseh shabbos is an issur gavrah, the pot it was cooked in will be permitted. Whereas according to Reb Moshe the pot will be forbidden. In this situation R' Chaim Brisker ends up being the more lenient opinion.
Another difference between if the prohibition is an issur gavrah or issur cheftzah is, whether or not we can apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu to ma'asei shabbos (mitzvos were not given for the purpose of personal pleasure). A classic example of this rule is a lulav of issurai han'ah (forbidden to benefit from) that one may use for a mitzvah. The Rashba and other rishonim hold that even physical benefit derived during the performance of a mitzvah is permitted. Therefore if one were to perform a mitzvah with an item that was forbidden he would still be permitted to derive a physical pleasure from it. This only applies to an item that is intrinsically prohibited. However if the restriction is only on the person, the mitzvah cannot allow him to use the item.
Therefore, if one heated up a mikvah on shabbos, which is one of the thirty nine milochos, according to Reb Moshe that maiseh shabbos is intrinsically prohibited we may apply the rule of mitzvos lav lihanos nitnu and as a result one may enter into the mikvah for mitzvah purposes, even though a physical pleasure will be endured. Whereas according to Reb Chaim one may not enter into such a mikvah.
[The Magen Avraham (318:1) quotes a Rashba saying that the pot that one cooked in is in fact prohibited. This supports the opinion of Reb Moshe Feinstein.]
For questions and comments about this column email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
Friday, February 25, 2011
Friday, February 11, 2011
Tetzaveh - Shatnez - Assey Docheh Lo Sa'asey
In this week’s parsha we learn about the vestments of the Kohanim. Interestingly, several
of the vestments are comprised of wool and linen materials. Although normally a garment
containing wool and linen is forbidden to wear for it is shatnez, obviously with regard
to the garments of the Kohanim the Torah has permitted this prohibition. We must try
to understand which method the Torah applied in permitting the issur of shatnez in the
Kohanim’s garments in order to properly apply this to other aspects of the torah. One
possible method the Torah could have applied is known as asay docheh Lo Sa'asey,
which means that in order to perform an Assey (positive commandment) one may
transgress a Lo Sa'asey (negative commandment) that would otherwise have prevented
him from performing the Assey. In this understanding the prohibition to wear shatnez
includes the Kohanim’s clothing however they may transgress the Lo Sa'asey in order to
perform the mitzvah of the avodah. Tosafos in Yivamos 5b asks why is it that we do not
learn from the bigday Kihunah to the rest of the torah that Assey is docheh Lo Sa'asey.
This is a clear indication that Tosafos has this view of how the Kohanim may wear
shatnez in their vestments.
The other option is that the torah did not extend the prohibition of shatnez to the
garments of the Kohanim to begin with, this is called hutrah. When the Torah applies
hutrah, there is no prohibition for one to transgress therefore one may do the avairah
even though it is not in order to perform the mitzvah.
The Rambam (hilchos kilaim 10:32) writes, Kohanim that wear their special garments
not while performing the avodah are punished by lashes for having transgressed the
prohibition of shatnez, for they were only allowed to wear shatnez during the avodah as
it is a mitzvah. The Raivad argues with the Rambam, that the Kohanim may wear their
special garments even while they are not performing the avodah.
It seems that the basis for the machlokes between the Rambam and the Raivad is
dependent on the two aforementioned options. The Rambam who holds one can only
wear the garments during the avodah holds that the method used by the torah to permit
the Kohanim to wear shatnez is Assey docheh Lo Sa'asey. As mentioned earlier Assey
docheh Lo Sa'asey can only be applied in order to perform a mitzvah, therefore while a
kohain is not performing the avodah he may not don the garments containing shatnez.
The Raivad however is of the opinion that the method used in the Kohanim’s vestments
is hutrah. That is why he permits wearing the garments even while not performing the
avodah, for with regard to the Kohanim’s garments the Torah never prohibited shatnez.
The gimorah in yivamos (4a) says one may wear shatnez in tzitzis, and similarly it is
unclear if it is permitted by means of hutrah or dichuya. The Shagas Aryeh (siman 30)
asks the following contradiction in the Raivad. In hilchos tzitzis (3:9) the Raivad says
that women and slaves who are not obligated in the mitzvah of tzitzis may not wear tzitzis
containing shatnez. The implication of the Raivad is that the method in which one may
wear shatnez in tzitzis is deychuyah -only in order to perform the mitzvah. This seems
to contradict his opinion expressed by his p’sak regarding the garments of the Kohanim
in which he permitted even not in order to perform a mitzvah, implying he holds that it
works through hutrah.
Reb Elchonan Wasserman zt”l Hy”d (kovaitz haurus 9:1) explains that the Raivad holds
Rabbi Raphael Fuchs
that the Torah uses both hutrah and dichuya depending on the situation. In a situation
where a mitzvah is never able to be performed without violating a prohibition, the
Torah uses hutrah. For example the mitzvah of yiebum can only be performed on a dead
brother’s wife whom is prohibited to the live brother. There will never be a mitzvah of
yiebum that does not entail violating this prohibition therefore it is permitted by means
of hutrah. Similarly with regard to the bigdai kehuna the Torah commands us of which
materials the garments must be made. Since two of the materials are wool and linen,
the mitzvah of the Kohen’s garments will always be in violation of shatnez. Therefore
the Raivad says that it is permitted by means of hutrah, even not for the purpose of the
mitzvah. Whereas in a situation where there is a way to perform the mitzvah without
violating any prohibition, the torah in telling us we can violate a prohibition uses dichuy.
The aforementioned gimorah extrapolates from the Torah that we may use shatnez in
tzitzis. However not every pair of tzitzis will be in violation of the prohibition, for not
every pair will have shatnez, therefore the Raivad understands that the torah with regard
to shatnez in tzitzis is using diechuy.
of the vestments are comprised of wool and linen materials. Although normally a garment
containing wool and linen is forbidden to wear for it is shatnez, obviously with regard
to the garments of the Kohanim the Torah has permitted this prohibition. We must try
to understand which method the Torah applied in permitting the issur of shatnez in the
Kohanim’s garments in order to properly apply this to other aspects of the torah. One
possible method the Torah could have applied is known as asay docheh Lo Sa'asey,
which means that in order to perform an Assey (positive commandment) one may
transgress a Lo Sa'asey (negative commandment) that would otherwise have prevented
him from performing the Assey. In this understanding the prohibition to wear shatnez
includes the Kohanim’s clothing however they may transgress the Lo Sa'asey in order to
perform the mitzvah of the avodah. Tosafos in Yivamos 5b asks why is it that we do not
learn from the bigday Kihunah to the rest of the torah that Assey is docheh Lo Sa'asey.
This is a clear indication that Tosafos has this view of how the Kohanim may wear
shatnez in their vestments.
The other option is that the torah did not extend the prohibition of shatnez to the
garments of the Kohanim to begin with, this is called hutrah. When the Torah applies
hutrah, there is no prohibition for one to transgress therefore one may do the avairah
even though it is not in order to perform the mitzvah.
The Rambam (hilchos kilaim 10:32) writes, Kohanim that wear their special garments
not while performing the avodah are punished by lashes for having transgressed the
prohibition of shatnez, for they were only allowed to wear shatnez during the avodah as
it is a mitzvah. The Raivad argues with the Rambam, that the Kohanim may wear their
special garments even while they are not performing the avodah.
It seems that the basis for the machlokes between the Rambam and the Raivad is
dependent on the two aforementioned options. The Rambam who holds one can only
wear the garments during the avodah holds that the method used by the torah to permit
the Kohanim to wear shatnez is Assey docheh Lo Sa'asey. As mentioned earlier Assey
docheh Lo Sa'asey can only be applied in order to perform a mitzvah, therefore while a
kohain is not performing the avodah he may not don the garments containing shatnez.
The Raivad however is of the opinion that the method used in the Kohanim’s vestments
is hutrah. That is why he permits wearing the garments even while not performing the
avodah, for with regard to the Kohanim’s garments the Torah never prohibited shatnez.
The gimorah in yivamos (4a) says one may wear shatnez in tzitzis, and similarly it is
unclear if it is permitted by means of hutrah or dichuya. The Shagas Aryeh (siman 30)
asks the following contradiction in the Raivad. In hilchos tzitzis (3:9) the Raivad says
that women and slaves who are not obligated in the mitzvah of tzitzis may not wear tzitzis
containing shatnez. The implication of the Raivad is that the method in which one may
wear shatnez in tzitzis is deychuyah -only in order to perform the mitzvah. This seems
to contradict his opinion expressed by his p’sak regarding the garments of the Kohanim
in which he permitted even not in order to perform a mitzvah, implying he holds that it
works through hutrah.
Reb Elchonan Wasserman zt”l Hy”d (kovaitz haurus 9:1) explains that the Raivad holds
Rabbi Raphael Fuchs
that the Torah uses both hutrah and dichuya depending on the situation. In a situation
where a mitzvah is never able to be performed without violating a prohibition, the
Torah uses hutrah. For example the mitzvah of yiebum can only be performed on a dead
brother’s wife whom is prohibited to the live brother. There will never be a mitzvah of
yiebum that does not entail violating this prohibition therefore it is permitted by means
of hutrah. Similarly with regard to the bigdai kehuna the Torah commands us of which
materials the garments must be made. Since two of the materials are wool and linen,
the mitzvah of the Kohen’s garments will always be in violation of shatnez. Therefore
the Raivad says that it is permitted by means of hutrah, even not for the purpose of the
mitzvah. Whereas in a situation where there is a way to perform the mitzvah without
violating any prohibition, the torah in telling us we can violate a prohibition uses dichuy.
The aforementioned gimorah extrapolates from the Torah that we may use shatnez in
tzitzis. However not every pair of tzitzis will be in violation of the prohibition, for not
every pair will have shatnez, therefore the Raivad understands that the torah with regard
to shatnez in tzitzis is using diechuy.
For questions and comments about this column email: RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com
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