Tuesday, June 7, 2011

The Geirus Of Mattan Torah

The Rama (Orach Chaim 490:9) says that we are accustomed to reading Megillas
Rus on Shavuos. The Vilna Gaon suggests that the reason for this custom is that since our
fathers accepted the Torah on Shavuos, and thereby were nisga'er (converted), we read
the megillah that discusses Rus, who similarly was nisgarah.

The Gemaras, in Yevamos 46a and Krisus 9a, say that at Mattan Torah Klal
Yisrael entered into a bris through geirus. We learn several halachos of geirus for future
generations from the geirus of Mattan Torah. One halacha that we learn is that just as
our fathers required milah, tevilah and korban to convert, future converts require the
same.

The Gemara in Shabbos 130a explains the pasuk in Bamidbar 11:10, “Vayishma
Moshe es ha’um boche l’mishpichosam,” as follows: The Bnei Yisrael were crying over the fact
that they became forbidden to marry their relatives after Mattan Torah. The Maharal (in
Gur Aryeh Parshas Vayigash,) asks about the Gemara in Yevamos 22a that says that a
ger can marry his biological sister because ger she’nisgaer k’katan she’nolad dami – a
convert is considered as if he was just born; therefore he is not considered related to his
biological family, even if they too subsequently convert. Since, as stated earlier, Bnei
Yisrael became converts at Mattan Torah, why then were Bnei Yisrael in that generation
crying over the prohibition of marrying relatives? Since they were converts, they had no
relatives that were forbidden to them!

The Maharal answers that the rule of ger she’nisgaer k’katan she’nolad dami can
only be applied to someone who converts willingly, by his own volition. Since at Mattan
Torah, Hashem forced Bnei Yisrael to accept the Torah, we cannot apply the rule and they
became forbidden to marry their relatives.

The sefer, Harirai Kedem, explains that the geirus of Mattan Torah was not
that each individual converted on an individual level all at once; rather it was a geirus
of the tzibur (communal conversion). By Mattan Torah the entire nation converted as
one; when all of Klal Yisrael proclaimed “na’aseh v’nishma” - k’ish echad b’lev echad, it
was an acceptance of the yoke of the Torah and mitzvos as a whole nation. The Rambam
(Hilchos Isssurei Biah 13:3) writes that the korban at Mattan Torah was brought al
yidai kol Yisrael. The Rambam seems to say that the korban was a korban tzibur. We
can understand that since there was a conversion of the tzibur, the tzibur had to bring a
korban tzibur.

Based on this we can answer the Maharal’s question mentioned earlier of why
the Bnei Yisrael of that generation cried over their newly forbidden relatives. We only
say that a convert is considered to be newborn and unrelated to his biological family –
even if they later convert, when a ger first converts alone. As explained earlier, at Mattan
Torah the geirus was not an individual conversion, but rather it was one geirus which
incorporated the entire nation. Perhaps as one geirus, everyone's biological relatives remain their relatives. Therefore Bnei Yisrael of the generation of Mattan Torah cried over the prohibition to marry relatives.

The Gemara in Kisubos 11a quotes Rav Huna that bais din can convert a ger
kattan (a minor who his mother had brought to convert). The Gemara seeks a possible
source for Rav Huna’s halacha from various mishnayos – but to no avail. The Ritvah
asks why the Gemara doesn’t suggest that the source for Rav Huna’a halacha is from
Mattan Torah. After all, there were k'tanim present at Mattan Torah. And if the geirus
of Mattan Torah was not similar to that of Rav Huna’s halacha, then how did the geirus
of Mattan Torah work on k'tanim?

Based on the aforementioned explanation that the geirus of Mattan Torah was a
geirus of the tzibur, we can answer the Ritvah’s question. The Gemara cannot cite Mattan
Torah as a source for Rav Huna’s halacha because the geirus of Mattan Torah was a
geirus of the tzibur. Therefore, as members of the tzibur, the k'tanim were included in
the geirus. However a private geirus performed by beis din may arguably not be done on behalf of a kattan.

{R.F.}


For questions or comments regarding this dvar torah, e-mail RabbiRFuchs@gmail.com.

Kabalas HaTorah

“Moshe brought the people forth from the camp toward Hashem, and they stood under the mountain.” (Yisro 19:17)


The Gemara brings a statement in Maseches Shabbos (88a) that Hashem, during Kabalas HaTorah, held Har Sinai over the Jews and forced acceptance of the Torah. One familiar with the basic storyline is struck with a glaring question: The Jews had already declared their commitment to Hashem with the utterance “Na’aseh v’Nishmah,” (“we will do and we will hear”). Why should Hashem “force” the Jewish people into a situation after the Jewish people had already confirmed their relationship with Hashem and the Torah in no uncertain terms? Further, framing acceptance of the Torah in this context would only seem to take away from the Jews independent kabalah!

No ink has been spared on this question. One answer generally brought by chazal is that of Tosafos, that Hashem was concerned that that the Jews would change their minds out of fear upon experiencing the awesome spectacle at Har Sinai. Another oft cited opinion is found in Medrash Tanchuma (Parshas Noach) that the declaration of Na’aseh v’Nishmah was made only in connection Torah She’Biksav. The Jews, however, at that time, were not willing to accept upon themselves Torah She’Ba’al Peh and had to be coerced. The Medrash concludes that the ameilus necessary to engage in the limud of Torah She’Ba’al Peh can come about only through ahavas Hashem. Notably, the Gemara says that the Jews lovingly 're-accepted' the Torah after the events of Purim.

I would like to propose another approach to answer why the Torah was given with the “mountain over our heads” that is perhaps more relevant to our generation than ever before:

The Rambam enumerates 13 ikkarim - known as 'the 13 ani ma'amins' - that one must fully believe and accept in order to be considered a religious Jew. Rabbi Yaakov Weinberg, in his discussion of the 1st of the ikkarim, explains that one must believe and internalize the absoluteness of Hashem. (article available at http://www.aish.com/sp/ph/48923722.html). The Rambam (explained by Rabbi Weinberg) maintains that the truth of the Torah itself depends upon its being derivative from an absolute source.
Without an objective source for Torah ideals, any ethical system can be judged in terms of modern day  thinking. One could not otherwise explain seeming inconsistencies such as why it is one of the “big 3 aveiros” to murder, and yet a Torah commandment to kill Amalek. After all, one may argue, it is unfair to hold Amalek’s descendants accountable for their ancestor’s actions at the time of Yetzias Mitrayim. The absolute objectivity of the Source of our religion explains why we calibrate ourselves to the Torah rather than judge the Torah by modern day standards.

I would like to introduce a thought based on something I once heard from R’ Yitzchak Berkowitz. Throughout history, there were generally accepted societal ideals despite rationalizations that may have been employed to justify contrary modes of conduct; As is often said, one does not have to be a triangle to teach geometry.

By contrast, one does not have to look very far into the headlines of today to see that the average person growing up has no way to distinguish right from wrong, good from bad, appropriate from inappropriate or even what values one should prioritize. (See articles “UN Document Would Give 'Mother Earth' Same Rights as Humans http://www.commondreams.org/headline/2011/04/13-2 .)
Therefore, the Torah had to be given with the mountain "over our heads" (whether midrashim are meant to be taken literally is beyond the scope of this dvar torah); it had to be muchrach. Indeed, the Jewish people had already committed themselves. However, if our acceptance of the Torah was based solely on our kabalah, the introduction of Torah to the world, and to the Jewish people, would have historically been tied to the acknowledgement of a nation at a given point in time. There would be room for the argument that their acceptance was appropriate for the time, but, after all, times have changed!

Accordingly, the introduction of the Torah into creation had to indicate that Torah is intrinsically ‘absolute'. Not originating or dependant upon the approval of mankind. Rather the Torah is an objective source of truth from Hashem, to be referred to by all people of all origins in any generation, independent of the Jews’ acceptance at that time.

May we be zocheh to once again to adjust ourselves and our mindsets to the priorities and ideals of the Torah and be Mekabel the Torah b'ahavah this Shavuos!

Gut Yom Tov! {M.R.}

To comment on this dvar torah email michaeljrubin@gmail.com or kollelh@gmail.com